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DAVID C. BALUARTE*
ABSTRACT

Within days of President Donald Trump's 2017 Executive Orders on
border security and immigration enforcement, President Mauricio Macri
of Argentina issued a Decree to address what he declared was an urgent
problem of immigrant criminality. The timing of the two Presidents'
actions triggered concerns that U.S.-style restrictionist immigration
regulation was spreading to South America, a continent that has taken
progressive steps towards recognizing the human rights of migrants in
recent years. Until Macri's 2017 Decree, Argentina was considered a
leader in this regard, with its 2004 immigration law that boldly codified a
"right to migrate" and included robust substantive and procedural
protectionsfor immigrants. While the Decree marked the end of an era of
progressive immigration policy in Argentina, the persistence of
international human rights protections for migrants could provide the
means to uphold key aspects of the right to migrate. This Article tracks
jurisprudentialdevelopments under the 2004 law, and then demonstrates
how the 2017 Decree undermined many of the advances achieved under
the prior legislative framework. The Article also provides an overview of
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current litigation to defend the immigrant bill of rights and key procedural
and judicial protections. The Article argues that the application of
internationalhuman rights law on migration could fend off some of the
more perniciousfeatures of the 2017 Decree in Argentina. The Article
concludes that the right to migrate in Argentina has been weakened, but
that its essence will persist if the Argentine judiciary reinforces human
rightsprotectionsfor migrants.
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INTRODUCTION

In early 2017, President Mauricio Marci of Argentina issued a Decree
to toughen immigration regulation in response to what his administration
articulated as an urgent problem of criminality among immigrants. This
action was instantly compared to the executive orders issued just days
earlier by United States President Donald J. Trump.2 The similarity in the
rhetoric each President used to justify his actions drew the attention of the
Argentine public and officials throughout Latin America.3 This is in part
because Argentina had made great strides over more than a decade to forge
a reputation as a model for progressive immigration policy, in stark
contrast to the United States, which has responded to immigration with
increasingly harsh deportation and detention practices during the same
period.4 Indeed, the Argentine legislature enacted a progressive
immigration law in 2004, and in it established a "right to migrate," which
many have suggested lays the conceptual foundation for understanding
migration as a human right.5
Argentina's cutting-edge Law 25.871 of 2004 ("the 2004 Law") was
enacted against the backdrop of a troubled history of immigration
regulation. The law in effect prior to the enactment of the 2004 Law was a
dictate of the military junta that ruled Argentina from 1976-83.6 The
Videla Law, as it was known, provided the National Department of

I
Decreto 70/2017, Modifying Law No. 25.871, Jan. 27, 2017, [33555] B.O. I [hereinafter
DNU] (translation by author).
Simon Romero & Daniel Politi, Argentina's Trump-Like Immigration Order Rattles South
2
(Feb.
4,
2017),
N.Y.
TIMES
America,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/americas/argentinas-trump-like-immigration-orderrattles-south-america.html.
3
See, e.g., Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No.
13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, § 1 (Jan. 25, 2017) (stating that "[a]mong those who illegally enter are
those who seek to harm Americans through acts of terror or criminal conduct. Continued illegal
immigration presents a clear and present danger to the interests of the United States."); see also
Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg.
8799, § 1 (Jan. 25, 2017) ("Tens of thousands of removable aliens have been released into
communities across the country . . . . The presence of such individuals in the United States ...

[is]

contrary to the national interest.").
4
Marisa Franco & Carlos Garcia, The Deportation Machine Obama Built for President
Trump, THE NATION (June 27, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-deportation-machineobama-built-for-president-trump/.
5
Barbara Hines, The Right to Migrateas a Human Right: The Current Argentine Immigration
Law, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 471 (2010); Lila Garcia, Migraciones, Estado y una politica del derecho
humano a migrar: ihacia una nueva era en America Latina?, 88 COLOMBIA INTERNACIONAL 107,

109-10, 112 (2016).
6
Ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigraci6n, Law No. 22439, Mar. 23, 1981,
[24637] B.O. 6.
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Migration (in Spanish, "DNM") with largely unreviewable powers to
manage the task of immigration enforcement as it deemed appropriate. A
decade later, in unmistakable reaction to the authoritarian government that
had taken nearly thirty thousand civilian lives in the name of public order,
Argentina had passed the 1994 Constitution, which placed core
international human rights treaties on par with the constitution itself.8
While that same constitution established that non-citizens have the same
civil rights as citizens, 9 human rights did not permeate the sphere of
immigration law until the legislature promulgated Law 25.871. 10 The 2004
Law, passed with the overwhelming support of lawmakers at the time,11
established a right to migrate, and included a range of legal protections
and policy objectives in furtherance of immigrant rights and the human
dignity of migrants.12
In order to advance immigrant rights, the 2004 Law established robust
substantive and procedural protections for migrants seeking lawful status
to remain in Argentina. First, it includes a bill of rights that reinforces the
notion of equal rights between non-citizens and citizens established under
the 1994 Constitution, provides expansive social and economic rights
guarantees, and promotes family unity through a variety of provisions.' 3
The bill of rights further includes the novel concept of a right to migrate,
puts the burden on the State to provide irregular migrants with public
assistance to regularize their situation, and mandates the development of
regularization programs.1 4 Second, the law codified robust procedural
guarantees, which included multiple levels of appeal of adverse decisions,
free legal assistance for immigrants in expulsion proceedings at the

7
Barbara Hines, An Overview of Argentine Immigration Law, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
395, 405-06 (1999). Hines recalls that, under the Videla Law, there were no regulations governing the
"initiation of expulsion proceedings, bond, burden of proof, or the conduct of the hearing." Id. at 405.
There were no immigration courts or independent judges, and thus, the "majority of cases [were]
resolved without formal hearings, bond, or appeals." Id. The lack of direct judicial review of a
negative decision provided the Immigration Department with largely unreviewable authority. A party
seeking to appeal a negative decision was able only to proceed by means of a "constitutional amparo,
or habeas corpus." Id. at 406.
8
Art. 75.22, CONSTITUCI6NNACIONAL [Const. Nac.] (Arg.).

9

Id. art. 20.

10 Hines, supra note 5, at 482-84.
11 Susana Novick, Migracidn y politicas en Argentina: Tres leyes para un pais extenso (18762004), at 142-43, in LAS MIGRACIONES EN AMERICA LATINA: POLITICAS, CULTURAS Y ESTRATEGIAS

(Susana Novick ed., 2008).
12 PABLO CERIANI CERNADAS & DIEGO MORALES, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE
DERECHOs HUMANOS, ARGENTINA: AVANCES Y ASIGNATURAS PENDIENTES EN LA CONSOLIDACION
DE UNA POLITICA MIGRATORIA BASADA EN LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, 9-10 (2011).

13
14

See Law No. 25871, Jan. 21, 2004, [30322] B.O. 2 [hereinafter the 2004 Law].
E.g. id. arts. 17, 61, 70.
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expense of the State, and a presumption against detention during those
proceedings.1 5
The 2004 Law is not only about migrants' rights, however, and it
includes more traditional immigration priorities related to public security
and economic development. One evident limitation on the right to migrate
appears in a set of provisions that prevent persons who have committed
certain crimes from entering or remaining in the country.16 In essence, the
right to migrate is tempered by certain expectations that a migrant comply
with the laws in his home country as well as the laws of Argentina, and a
failure to meet such expectations can lead to the State's refusal to grant
entry or the termination of legal residency.1 7 Notably, only serious crimes
prevented migration under the 2004 Law, and these legal impediments
were clearly balanced against fundamental human rights considerations
such as family unity.
On January 27, 2017, President Macri issued a Decree of Necessity and
Urgency (in Spanish, "DNU"), a novel feature of the 1994 Constitution
that permits a sitting President to pass a law, if both houses of Congress do
not oppose the law.' 8 The DNU set forth statistics, claiming that
immigrants were disproportionately represented in the prison population,
and that a substantial proportion of them were imprisoned for drug
crimes.1 9 These statistics, together with President Macri's observation that
expulsion proceedings "may last" as long as seven years, were used to
justify the establishment of a summary expulsion procedure for persons
with criminal history, as well as other irregular migrants, and greater
authority to detain migrants in expulsion proceedings. 20 Shortly after the
DNJ was issued, civil society organizations argued that the President had
overrepresented the actual proportion of immigrants in prison, and that the
modifications to the existing law were not justified by a situation of

15

See id. tit. VI.; see also id. art. 70.

16

See id. arts. 29, 63.
.

17 Article 5 of the 2004 Law is evidence of this tempering or restriction of the impact and reach
of the anti-discriminatory aims of the 2004 Law. Article 5 requires that "'the government guarantee .
. equal treatment . .. so long as [foreigners] satisfy the established conditions for their entry and stay
[in the country], according to the laws . . . .' Hines, supra note 5, at 490-91 (citing the 2004 Law, art.
5.) Hines argues that "[a] literal reading of the text of this article could lead to the conclusion that
some type of disparate treatment might still be permissible against persons in irregular status. Such an
interpretation would contravene the more liberal provisions of the law . . . ." Id.
18 Art. 99.3, CONSTITUClON NACIONAL [Const. Nac.] (Arg.).
19 DNU, supra note 1, Preamble (claiming that while immigrants only made up 4.5% of the
Argentine population overall, they made up more than 21% of the prison population, and that 33% of
all persons incarcerated for drug crimes were immigrants).

20 Id.
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necessity or urgency. 21 At that point, however, the DNU was law and there
was insufficient political will for both houses of Congress to nullify the
Decree, as required by the constitution.22
The DNU drastically expanded the types of criminal activity that will
provide a basis for the denial of admission or the cancelation of residency.
Under current law, if there is a reason to believe that a non-citizen has
committed a crime that could be punished with imprisonment, the noncitizen is inadmissible, and if the immigrant has lawful residency, that
status is automatically canceled.23 For many, there is no defense, and no
opportunity to argue equitable considerations such as family unity. Such
non-citizens are funneled into a summary expulsion procedure that
provides only three days to respond to the charges, and another three days
24
to appeal an adverse decision. Moreover, the law increases the likelihood
25
of detention during the pendency of those proceedings.
At the time of this writing, the DNU is embroiled in litigation with an
appeal pending before the Argentine Supreme Court that will decide the
fate of the Decree. First, a federal judge largely rejected a collective legal
challenge to the DNU brought by civil society organizations, suggesting
that individuals must challenge the law to defend their individual rights. 26
Then, an appeals court ruled that the DNU is unconstitutional, with two
judges finding that the President had failed to establish the requisite
"necessity and urgency," and a third judge finding that the Decree violated
various rights guarantees under Argentine law. The case is now pending

21 See, e.g., Senate Debate, Feb. 16, 2017 (translation by author).
22 This conclusion is drawn from interviews with immigration experts in Argentina, and can be
inferred from a Senate debate that began in February 2017, and to date has not reconvened to finish
discussion or vote on the matter.

23 DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying article 29 of the 2004 Law); id art. 7 (modifying article
62 of the 2004 Law).
24

DNU, supra note 1, arts. 9-20.

25

DNU, supra note 1, art. 21 (modifying article 70 of the 2004 Law).

26 Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. I []a Inst.] [Federal Administrative
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo

Ley 16.986," https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf,

at 3-4

(agreeing with an opinion filed by the Public Minister who found that the collective process was an
inappropriate mechanism to bring claims related to the termination of residency and the family
reunification waiver due to the individualized nature of the rights at issue, and pronouncing that the
court would not analyze these claims so as not to be redundant).
27 Camara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c.
EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf, at 45 (Judge Treacy finding that the DNU is an
unconstitutional overreach of executive power, inasmuch as it constitutes legislation that does not meet
the specific constitutional requirements of necessity and urgency set forth in article 99.3 of the

constitution); id. at 47 (Judge Gallegos Fedriani adopting the opinion of Judge Treacy); id at 17-19
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before the Argentine Supreme Court, which granted the government's
petition for extraordinary review, leaving the fate of the 2017 Decree
28
uncertain. The pending appeal suspends the judgment of the appeals
court, and permits the government to continue to apply the DNU, 29 such
that individual immigrants are now compelled to formulate their own
challenges to the law to defend against expulsion.
This Article argues that the persistence of the right to migrate under
Argentine law, together with international human rights norms embedded
in the 2004 Law and the Argentine Constitution, may provide an important
safeguard against the most deleterious effects of the DNU. The discussion
will proceed in three parts. The first part will examine the evolution of
immigrant rights in Argentina. It will begin with a brief historical account
of immigration regulation in Argentina, and describe the forces that
brought about the seismic shift in the 2004 Law. It will then summarize
the main provisions of the 2004 immigration law and the 2010 regulations
that accompany that law, with a particular focus on the law's substantive
rights and procedural guarantees.
The second part of this Article will present the DNU, its rationale, and
its main provisions, and will highlight the ways in which the DNU
modifies the 2004 Law. In particular, this section will examine those ways
in which the DNU serves to undermine the progressive provisions of the
2004 Law summarized in the first section. It will emphasize in particular
the predictable effects of the summary expulsion procedure, as compared
to the robust procedures that existed under the prior law, and the likely
strain on the fundamental right to family unity. This section will then
examine the early results of a collective action that challenged the
constitutionality of the DNJ, denouncing various provisions of the law as
inconsistent with international human rights law and the Argentine
Constitution.
The third part of the Article will argue that international human rights
law, applied directly though Argentine law, may be used to uphold some
key aspects of the right to migrate in Argentina. In particular, this section

(Judge Alemany invalidating the summary expulsi6n procedure, the detention provisions, and the
limitations on the family reunification waiver, discussed in sections X, XI, and XII of his opinion,
respectively) (translation by author).
28 Maia Jastreblansky, Inquietud en el Gobierno por un fallo de la Corte que define el alcance
de los DNU, LA NACION (July 10, 2018), https://www.lanacion.com.ar/2151660-inquietud-en-elgobiemo-por-un-fallo-de-la-corte-que-define-el-alcance-de-los-dnu.
29 Martin Bravo, La Corte deberd resolver otro tema sensible para el Gobierno: el DNU por
los extranjeros, CLARfN (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.clarin.com/politica/corte-debera-resolver-temasensible-gobiemo-dnu-extranjeros 0 rlUb8gaoM.html.
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will present relevant human rights norms that protect the substantive rights
of migrants, most notably to family unity, as well as procedural
protections that should be accorded to them. There is potential, through
individual litigation, if not the collective litigation still pending on appeal,
to assert core international human rights protections for unauthorized
migrants and residents alike who face summary expulsion procedure under
the new law. By ensuring the dignity of migrants, made exceedingly
vulnerable under the DNU, Argentina may still prevent the complete
erosion of the right to migrate established under the 2004 Law.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA

Argentina passed an immigration law in 2004 that has been widely
regarded as a model for humane immigration regulation. One of the most
ground-breaking developments in this regard was the decision by
Argentine legislators to characterize migration as a right, which many
have suggested laid the groundwork for understanding migration as a
human right.30 This is particularly significant when understood in the
context of Argentine history, inasmuch as the 2004 Law followed a
century of repressive immigration regulation. This section will examine
the evolution of immigrant rights in Argentina though a brief review of the
history that led to the passage of the 2004 Law. It will consider the novel
legal framework enacted in 2004, and focus in particular on clusters of
provisions that establish substantial substantive rights for migrants and
robust procedural and judicial protection for persons in expulsion
proceedings.
A.

A briefhistory ofArgentine immigration law

In the early years of the Argentine Republic, the government viewed
immigration as essential to the growth and establishment of the State. This
idea was enshrined in the Argentine Constitution in 1853, which
announced that "to govern is to populate," suggesting both that
immigration policies were intertwined with the authority of the State, and
that such policies should promote immigration. 31 This was reflected in the
first immigration law, the Avellaneda Law, passed in 1876 with the goal
of encouraging immigration to populate and develop the vast Argentine

30
31

See Hines, supra note 5.
See Hines, supra note 7, at 395-96.
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territory. 32 A policy of largely open borders continued as the country
received waves of European migration through the nineteenth century, but
with the express understanding that migration should be European. 33
In 1902, the Argentine legislature passed the Residence Law, Law No.
4144, which limited immigration. Specifically, the Residence Law
"authorized the executive branch to expel or prevent the entry of
foreigners whose conduct compromised national security or public order,"
which provided the authority to discriminate against migrants on the basis
of political ideology. 34 The law's origins date back to a Senate debate in
1899, in which Senator Miguel Cand proposed that the Senate deport
"foreigners who endangered order and security." 35 He spoke of immigrants
with powerful and condemning language, saying that they were "enemies
of the social order with the intent of committing the foulest of crimes in
pursuit of a . . . chaotic ideal that defies intelligence and chills the heart." 36
The following years in Argentina marked the growth of labor movements,
and immigrants formed the base of Argentina's new urban working
class.37 The Residence Law ushered in a period of institutional and
systematic discrimination against the immigrant community as a response
to this societal shift.
Under the Residence law, the Executive had the power to order
individuals deported and to detain them from the moment of the order
until their final deportation. 39 They would be deported in three days, with

32 Novick, supra note 11, at 3-4.
33 Article 25 of the Constitution of 1853 stated that "the Federal Government shall encourage
European Immigration." Art. 25, 1853 CONSTITUC16N ARGENTINA. Some argue that this article
expresses merely a "preference" toward European immigration because the subsequent clause decrees
that all persons coming to Argentina from abroad "to carry out the goals listed in the Constitution have
the right to enter the country." Hines, supra note 7, at 396. Hines argues that "[n]evertheless, the fact
that the Constitution specifically promotes European immigration affects the current immigration
debate, given that the majority of recent immigrants are from neighboring Latin American countries."

Id. at 396-97.
34 See Hines, supra note 5, at 480. This law can be compared to the Immigration Act of 1920 in
the United States, which "provid[ed] for the exclusion of [individuals] who advocated [for] the
overthrow of the government[,] . . . opposed organized government, or who was a member of any
organization teaching [such] views." Id. at 480 n.20.
35 Gabriela Anahi Costanzo, The Inadmissible Turned History: The 1902 Law of Residence and
the
1910
Law
of
Social
Defense,
3
SOCIEDAD
(BUENOS
AIRES)
(2007),

http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script-sciarttext&pid=S0327-77122007000200001.
36 See id.
37 Jeane DeLaney, National Identity, Nationhood, and Immigration in Argentina: 1810-1930,
5.2 STAN. ELECTRONIC HUMAN. REv.7 (1997), https://web.stanford.edu/group/SHR/5-2/delaney.html.
38 Maria ln6s Pacecca, Personas extranjeras en carceles federales: vulnerabilidad y
discriminaci6n, in Discriminaciones 6tnicas y nacionales: un diagn6stico participativo 127, 127
(Corina Courtis & Maria In6s Pacecca eds., 2011).

39

See id.
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no means provided, judicial or otherwise, to defend themselves or fight the
order.40 In the first week after passing the law, 500 people were deported.4 1
In addition to this broad power to deport, article 3 of the Residence Law
also gave the executive the power to block the entry of anyone whose
background indicated that they may compromise the public order.42 In
1932, the Supreme Court decided a constitutional challenge against the
Residence Law on behalf of thirty-three detained migrants in the
Transporte Chaco case.43 The Court upheld the Residence Law, reasoning
that the right of migrants under the Constitution to "till the soil, improve
industry, and teach the arts and sciences, did not prevent the government
from expelling those whose residence did not fulfill these goals.""4 The
Court also held that the Constitution's guarantee of the right to work and
reside in Argentina did not protect those who "threaten[ed] the public
order."

45

The military government that came to power in 1976 doubled down on
the commitment to restrictive immigration regulation with the 1981 Videla
Law, which gave near complete authority to the executive in immigration
matters."6 The stated purpose of the Videla Law was "to promote
immigration of those persons 'whose cultural characteristics allow for
adequate integration into Argentine society."4 7 Notably, this corresponded
with a demographic shift in migration to Argentina during this time.
Indeed, while migrants to Argentina had primarily been European through
the first half of the twentieth century, regional migration from Latin
American was on the rise in this period.4 Regardless, even for those

40

See id. at 128.

41

See Costanzo, supra note 35, at 4.

42

Law No. 4144, Nov. 22, 1902, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 560, 560.

43

See Hines, supra note 5, at 480, n.56.

44

See id. (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of

Justice], 6/5/1932, "Sim6n Scheimberg y Enrique Corona Martinez / habeas corpus en representaci6n
de treinta y tres extranjeros detenidos en el 'Transporte Chaco' de la Armada Nacional," Fallos (1932-

164-344) (Arg.)).
45 See id.
46 Law No. 22439, Mar. 23, 1981, [XLI-A] A.D.L.A. 1581. Notably, the undocumented
population increased as a result of the restrictive nature of the Videla Law. Experts and government
officials widely agree on this. See Hines, supra note 5, at 475-76. The Videla law "provided very few
avenues for legal immigration, particularly for those from neighboring countries and delegated near
unbridled discretion to immigration officials to deny, delay, or impede applications for legal status."

Id.
47 See Hines, supra note 5, at 481 (citing Law No. 22439, art. 2., Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A.
273 (repealed)).
48 See Hines, supra note 7, at 397 (citing Raul C. Rey Balmaceda, El Pasado: la Inmigraci6n
en la HistoriaArgentina, in 2 GEODOMOS 19, 44 (Graciela M. de Marco et al. eds., 1994) (noting that
17.8% of the immigrant population in Argentina hailed from neighboring Latin American countries by
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migrants who had the desired "cultural characteristics," legal paths for
immigration were seldom available.49
The military government practiced systematic grave violations of
human rights in order to maintain social and political control over the
country, and this extended to immigration regulation as well. 50 Noncitizens were deported "for illegal entry, violation of the terms of stay,
criminal conduct, and threats to national security or public order, without
even minimal due process." 5 ' Furthermore, the Videla Law had harsh
mandatory reporting requirements, which demanded that both citizens and
government officials "report undocumented immigrants who engaged in
commercial transactions, attempted to marry, or sought medical
treatment." 52 These provisions, coupled with largely unfettered authority
provided to officials to conduct searches for immigration violations
"without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a court order,"5 led to
frequent abuses of power in the detention and expulsion of immigrants.54
When the military dictatorship was finally ousted in 1983, political
leaders mobilized to install a system of government that would respect
fundamental human rights. This impulse was enshrined in the 1994
Constitution, which directly incorporated major international and regional
human rights treaties into domestic Argentine law, and in some cases,
codified

human

rights

as

on

par

with

the

Constitution

itself.5 5

Nevertheless, the 1994 Constitution gave broad authority to the Argentine
legislature to regulate immigration in the manner it deemed appropriate

1960, and by 1980 regional migration had increased significantly).
49 Id.
50 Article 20 of Law No. 22439 decreed that the "right of a foreigner to enter, reside and leave
the country, a right guaranteed to all inhabitants under article 14 of the Argentine Constitution, is
limited by the immigration laws." See Hines, supra note 7, at 395-96 (citing Law. No. 22439, art. 20,

Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273 (repealed)). This provides context on the power of the immigration
laws to restrict the rights afforded to migrants.

51

See Hines, supra note 5, at 481(citing Law. No. 22439, art. 3, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A.

273 (repealed)) (discussing the authority to remove immigrants for not following the law).

52 Id. (citing Law No. 22439, arts. 32, 105, 101, 103, 104, 106, Mar. 23 1981, [1981-A] L.A.
273 (repealed)).
53 Id. (citing Law No. 22439, art. 107, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273 (repealed)).
54 The Videla Law also restricted the ability of undocumented immigrants to integrate into
Argentine society. For example, the law decreed that only permanent or temporary residents could

attend secondary school. Id. (citing Law. No. 22439, art. 102, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 2713
(repealed)). Undocumented immigrants were also not permitted to purchase or rent property, and any
seller or landlord who allowed for this would be fined. Id. (citing Law No. 24393, art. 48, Nov. 18,

1994, [1994-C] L.A. 3228 (modifying Law No. 22439, art. 48, Mar. 23 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273);
Law. No. 22439, arts. 32, 48, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273 (repealed)).
55

Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalizationof Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or

Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 288-92 (1999).
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56

and in the national interest. Indeed, the new Constitution did nothing to
specifically curtail the broad immigration authority of the executive under
the dictatorship era Videla Law, notwithstanding inconsistencies between
the exercise of that authority and human rights law.57 Notably, during this
same period, the trend of increased regional migration continued with
nearly half of the immigrants in Argentina originating from Latin
American countries.58
In 2002, in a drastic shift in the restrictive immigration policy that had
characterized the previous century, Argentina entered into a free
movement agreement with other member nations of the South American
trading bloc, Mercosur. Negotiations that ultimately led to the approval of
the "Agreement on Residence for Nationals of State Parties in Mercosur"
opened with a Brazilian proposal for a "migration amnesty for Mercosur
nationals living elsewhere within the bloc without authorization." 59
However, based on its own recent experience with such regularization
programs, Argentina was unconvinced that a temporary amnesty would be
sufficient to alleviate the problem of irregular migration and countered
with a proposal for a "permanent, rather than temporary, mechanism for
Mercosur citizens to gain access to regular status."60 Ultimately,
Argentina's proposal prevailed and created a pathway to permanent
residency for Mercosur citizens living and working within the bloc.61 It
also established many rights for migrants, such as the right to family
reunification, the right to equal working conditions, and the right to

56 Article 75, paragraph 18 of the Constitution of 1994 allows for "'Powers of Congress ...

[t]o

provide whatever is conducive to the prosperity of the country, to the progress and welfare of all the
Provinces and for the advancement of. . . immigration . . . .' Hines, supra note 7, at 396 n.5. Article
67, paragraphs 11, 16, and 28 of the Constitution of 1853 are also examples of the broad powers
provided to the government to regulate immigration, according to Hines. See id.
57 Of particular importance were lawsuits brought by the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales

(CELS) and the Comisi6n Argentina de Refugiados (CAREF). The government actually stated to
CELS in negotiations on the case of Juan Carlos de la Torre, which was a case in front of the InterAmerican Commission for Human Rights of a Uruguayan individual who had resided in Argentina
with his Argentine-born wife and children, that it was willing to reform the Videla Law in order to
comply with human rights standards. See Hines, supra note 5, at 483-84 (citing Corte Suprema de

Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 22/12/2998, "Recurso de hecho
deducido por la defensa de De La Torre, Juan Carlos en la causa De la Torre, Juan Carlos / habeas

corpus," Fallos (1998-321-3646) (Arg.)).
58 See Hines, supra note 7, at 397-98 (citation omitted) (highlighting that roughly half of
Argentina's foreign-born population of 1.6 million came from surrounding Latin American countries

in 1991).
59 Diego Acosta, Free Movement in South America: The Emergence of an Alternative Model?,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movementsouth-america-emergence-alternative-model.

60
61

Id.
Id.
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education for children. 62 This treaty "transformed the migration regime for
South Americans,"63 and Argentina followed this exceptional regional
development with the progressive national immigration legislation in
2004.
Argentina's 2004 Law 25.871 set forth four clusters of objectives for
immigration regulation in Argentina." The first clear and overarching
concern was with the development of the nation. This is evidenced by the
interest in pursuing demographic goals in terms of population distribution
and growth, 65 the goal of advancing commerce, tourism, science and
technoloy7 66y,6and incorporating labor migrants for the benefit of the
republic. At the same time, there was a second, perhaps more subtle
concern for the integration of migrants into Argentine society. This was
expressed through the articulated needs to fortify Argentine culture
through immigration, 68 and to integrate permanent residents into the social
fabric of the country.69 Third, there was expressed concern for the
relationship between immigration and criminality. Indeed, the law
articulated the objectives of denying entry or expelling those persons
engaged in acts punishable under Argentine criminal law,70 as well as
combating international organized crime through immigration regulation.
Finally, the law promoted the fundamental human rights of migrants. 72 It
recalled the country's international obligations in the areas of human
rights, equality, and human mobility,73 and made specific reference to the
needs to promote family unity 74 and combat discrimination. 75

62
63

Id.
Id.

64

See The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 3.

65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

art. 3(b).
art. 3(i).
art. 3(h).
art. 3(c).
art. 3(e).
art. 3(j).
art. 3(k).

72 The 1994 Constitution gave "constitutional hierarchy to ten major international treaties that
Argentina had ratified at the time of the reform." It was within this context of focus on human rights
that Argentina enacted and crafted the 2004 Law. See Hines, supra note 5, at 482 (citing Levit, supra
note 55, at 288-91). The 2004 Law was compatible with the constitution, according to Eugenio
Zaffaroni, a constitutional scholar and member of the Supreme Court in Argentina. He stated that the
passage of the 2004 law "'signifie[d] the reestablishment of legal compatibility with constitutional
directives."' Id. at 485 (citing Eugenio Rail Zaffaroni, Migraciony Discriminacion:La Nueva Ley en
PerspectivaHistdrica,in MIGRACION: UN DERECHO HUMANO 45 (Prometeo 2004)).
73 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 3(a).

74
75

Id. art. 3(d).
Id. art. 3(f).
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The first three categories of objectives set forth in the law are common
in immigration legislation, and unsurprising when considered against the
backdrop of the century of immigration regulation that preceded the 2004
Law. Rights protection as an aspect of immigration regulation is much
more novel. Javier de Lucas writes that states are often concerned with: (1)
managing the immigrant population within the country, usually with a
focus on meeting the needs of the labor market, maintaining public order,
and integrating immigrants; (2) regulating migrant flows, commonly
reduced to border policy; and (3) conducting foreign relations with
countries that send migrants.7 6 According to de Lucas, states often do little
to legislate immigrant rights because they are not viewed as essential to
the primary considerations of security and the market.77
Moreover, states are generally disinclined to approach migration as a
right because such a conception limits their authority to manage immigrant
flows. Miguel Carbonell has suggested that states resist the
characterization of migration as a right because it requires a reexamination
of the rationale of borders in a socio-legal context, and a movement
towards the individual liberty of migrants. While the 2004 Argentine law
reflects the three major areas of concern highlighted by de Lucas, it is
remarkable in the strides it made to articulate and protect migrants'
fundamental rights.
B.

The rights protectiveframework of the 2004 Law

76 Javier de Lucas, Por qu6 no son prioritarios los derechos humanos en las politicas de
inmigraci6n (July 7, 2002) (7th Oscar Romero Migration & Solidarity Conference Committee paper),
(elaborating on the reasons
http://www.comitesromero.org/murcia/jornadas/DeLucas.html#tth_sEc3
and evidence that immigrant rights are not taken seriously in the debate about immigration policy).

77

Id. at 2.

SOCIALES EN EL
Carbonell, Derecho a Migrar, in INSTITUCIONES
78 Miguel
CONSTITUT[CIONALISMO CONTEMPORANEO 59, 62-63 (H6ctor Fix-Zamudio & Diego Valadds eds., 2d
ed. 2011), http://miguelcarbonell.com/artman/uploads/1/Derecho_a_Migrar.pdf.
79 This focus on fundamental human rights is not only evident in the text but is also clear in the
statements made by Argentinian officials at the time. For example, Argentine Ambassador, Leonardo
Franco, spoke to the United Nations about the 2004 Law and said,
[T]he search for better conditions of life in other countries must not be reproachable and
[must be] much less criminalized . . . . Argentina sealed this new spirit in its migrations
policies through the National Law of Migrations in 2004. This new law reflects the
commitment of our country to guarantee the full respect of human rights of the migrants and
their families and the sams [sic] time establishes mechanisms of easy access to regulate
migration, thus contributing to the elimination of any form of discrimination, xenophobia or

racism.
Hines, supra note 5, at 485. (citing Susana Novick, Una Nueva Ley para un Nuevo Modelo de
Desarrollo en un Contexto de Crisisy Consenso, in Migraci6n: un Derecho Humano 19, 67, 84-85

(Prometeo 2004)).
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This section considers the specific legal provisions of the 2004 Law as
a means of exploring a broader conception of immigrant rights in
Argentina. This discussion is divided into two parts, and begins with an
examination of the first title of the law that sets forth what could be
considered an immigrant bill of rights. This discussion examines the novel
"right to migrate" introduced by the 2004 Law, and discusses other key
protections such as the rights to equal protection of the law, family unity,
and the mandate that the State must regularize the situation of migrants.
The second part of the discussion explores the procedural and judicial
protections under the 2004 Law. These include an opportunity for
immigrants to regularize their status before the State may pursue
expulsion, a robust system of administrative and appellate review of an
expulsion order, and free legal services provided by the State to indigent
There is also a presumption
immigrants throughout this procedure.
against immigrant detention and strong judicial control over any detention
that does occur in this context. Together, the immigrant bill of rights in
conjunction with procedural and judicial protections created a progressive
and rights-centered model of migration regulation.
1.

An immigrant bill of rights

The first chapter of the 2004 Law is titled "The Rights and Liberties of
Foreigners," which suggests an immigrant bill of rights. The bill of rights
includes a novel right to migrate; ' equal protection under the law and
freedom from discrimination;82 access to education and healthcare;8 3
access to information and the means of integration;84 the right to family
unity;85 political rights; 86 labor rights; 87 property rights;88 and a catch-all

80 This is consistent with the way advocates speak about immigrant rights under the 2004 Law.
See, e.g., CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, MIGRANTES 1, 62 (Paula Arturo trans., 2013),
https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Migrantes.pdf (indicating that the 2004 Law
"required the State to establish mechanisms for regulating immigration, ensuring access to justice in
any deportation or detention procedure, while eliminating distinctions between the rights of Argentine
nationals and those foreign born.").
81 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 4 (translation by author).
82 Id. arts. 5, 6, 13 (this broad anti-discrimination provision of the law establishes as
discriminatory all acts or omissions motivated by ethnicity, religion, nationality, ideology, political
opinion, sex, gender, economic situation or physical characteristics, which arbitrarily impedes equal
enjoyment of rights guaranteed under laws, the constitution, or international treaties).

83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

arts. 7, 8.
arts. 9, 14.
art. 10.
art. 11.
art. 16.
art. 15.
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provision that incorporates rights guaranteed under international law.
Finally, the bill of rights creates an obligation on the State to implement
measures to regularize the legal status of migrants.9
The revolutionary scope of the 2004 Law is perhaps embodied in the
"right to migrate."9 1 The right to migrate is described as "essential and
inalienable," and the Republic of Argentina commits to guarantee this
right in accordance with the principles of equality and universality." 92 The
law itself does not elaborate on the content of this right, but courts have
since described it as a "paradigm shift" in the State's relationship with
migrants that compels Argentine authorities to regularize migrants,
interpret the law favorably to the migrant, and treat expulsion as a measure
of last resort. 93
In an early decision interpreting the 2004 Law, a federal appeals court
made clear the significance of the change in immigration policy that
emanated from the codification of a right to migrate. In Li Yun, Lingyan
Zheng, and Yu Junyun, a court reviewed the case of three Chinese
migrants who had been detained by immigration authorities after crossing
the border without authorization. 94 In discussing the rights of the women,
the court referred to the right to migrate as a "revolutionary precedent"
that converted migration into a "substantive right that does not depend on
the will of any State."9 5 The court expressed concern that this sentiment
had not penetrated actual practices of migration officials on the border, but
emphasized that the 2004 Law had heralded a new era after the
persecutory Videla Law. 96 The court in turn ordered that the three women
should be released from detention, guaranteed a lawyer at the expense of
the State, and provided assistance in regularizing their immigration status.
This shift is stunning when considered against the backdrop of the
previous century of immigration regulation in Argentina. It is also
remarkable in its implications for the limits on sovereign authority over
the entry of non-citizens into Argentine territory. The right to migrate

89
90
91
92

Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 4.
Id.

93

Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 3 [la Inst.]

[Federal Administrative

Litigation Court], 11/11/2013, "Garcia Castro, Jhon Darwin c. EN-M Interior-DNM-Disp. 264/10
(Expte. 2.167.684/06) / recurso directo para juzgados," (No. 10879/2010), 8-9 (translation by author),
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/GC,%20JD.pdf

94 Camara Federal De Apelaciones de Parana [CFed.], 10/12/2004, "Li Yun, Lingyan Zheng y
Yu Junyun / habeas corpus," L.S. Crim. (2004-11-396) (Arg.) (translation by author).

95 Id. at 3.
96 Id.
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bestowed certain rights on the individual migrant that the State could not
infringe, and thus represented a "paradigm shift." Indeed, the 2004 Law
not only prevented authorities from detaining irregular migrants at the
border, it required that they facilitate the entry of such migrants by
supplying them with legal counsel and time to prepare a case for
residency. 9 7
Just as the "right to migrate" facilitated the entry of some, it converted
expulsion into an "extreme measure of last resort." 98 Indeed, in GC, JD a
court cited the "right to migrate" in nullifying the expulsion order of a
Uruguayan man who had been convicted of a drug trafficking crime and
sentenced to approximately one year in prison while living without
authorization in Argentina. This case required that the court interpret
article 29(c) of the 2004 Law, which provided various criminal grounds
for inadmissibility, including drug trafficking or a crime punishable by
three years or more under Argentine law." The court interpreted the
provision of the law to require a sentence of three years or more for the
drug trafficking crime, a generous interpretation that blocked the
application of article 29(c) to the man, who was permitted to remain in
Argentina. 00
This jurisprudence on the "right to migrate" demonstrates that it may
be deployed to assist persons crossing the border to get out of detention
and secure representation, or assist someone defending against an order of
expulsion. The scope of this right to enter or stay, however, is really just
the tip of the iceberg, as the immigrant bill of rights offers an expansive
set of affirmative rights to immigrants present in Argentina.
For example, the bill of rights includes a proclamation of rights parity
between nationals and migrants in social services, public goods,
healthcare, education, justice, labor, employment, and social security.
Moreover, regulations promulgated in 2010 to provide greater guidance
explicitly recognized the role of the State in promoting the equal rights of
migrants by requiring the immigration authorities to act as the guardians of
human rights and the right to migrate announced in the 2004 Law.' 0' The
regulations further created a mandate for the federal government to

97

Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 3 []a Inst.]

[Federal Administrative

Litigation Court], 11/11/2013, "Garcia Castro, Jhon Darwin c. EN-M Interior-DNM-Disp. 264/10
(Expte. 2.167.684/06) / recurso directo para juzgados," (No. 10879/2010), 8 (translation by author),
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/GC,%20JD.pdf.

98
99
100
101

Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9-10.
Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 6.
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collaborate with provincial and municipal governments on programs to
integrate migrants into society and guarantee their equal access to the wide
range of rights set forth in the law. 10 2 This naturally reinforces the
obligation on the State established under the 2004 Law to facilitate the
integration of migrants, including through language classes, orientations
about rights and responsibilities, events honoring the culture and traditions
of immigrant populations, and courses to promote multiculturalism and
anti-discrimination.' 0 3
The 2004 Law also elaborates on the rights to education and healthcare,
which it implicitly recognizes as among the most fundamental rights for
migrants. In terms of education, the law states that immigration status
should never hinder access to education at any level, public or private.104
Similarly, it requires that access to healthcare must be provided to all,
independent of immigration status. 05 Further, the law creates an obligation
for educational institutions and healthcare providers to assist migrants with
the regularization of their immigration status.'10 This makes explicit the
bridge between the mandate to guarantee social and economic rights to
migrants in Argentina, and the mandate to regularize the status of the
immigrant population, discussed more below.
The bill of rights also creates an obligation on the Argentine State to
provide information to migrants about their rights under the law, and in
particular the legal requirements for their admission and stay.' 07 The law
further emphasizes that the State will coordinate the provision of this
information with employers and unions, and that the information will be
free and in languages that migrants can understand.1os The 2010
Regulations that followed further require regular capacity-building
seminars for immigration agents, including immigration police, on the
rights of migrants under the law.' 09 They also include a broader mandate to
organize a system of information and education for both public and private
entities that have regular contact with immiFants, including the education,
health, housing, and transportation sectors.
The 2004 Law includes a unique mandate to promote the right to

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id.
The Law of 2004, supranote 13, art. 14.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8.
Id. arts. 7, 8.
Id. art. 9.
Id.
Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 9(a).
Id. art. 9(b).
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political participation of migrants in Argentina, recognizing their right to a
voice in the selection of persons who will govern them. Broadly, the law
requires the government to provide foreigners with the knowledge and
means to participate in decisions about public life,"' and the 2010
regulations provided the specific requirement for the City of Buenos Aires
to orient migrants about their right to vote. 112
The immigrant bill of rights also directly incorporates all international
legal obligations to protect migrant rights.11 3 The 2004 Law gives
particular emphasis to the right to family reunification for immigrants, and
defines relevant family members as spouses, parents, minor children, and
children with limited capacity no matter their age.1 4 The 2010 Regulations
specifically provided the Convention on the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Their Families as one source of the legal protection of
immigrant families,"' inasmuch as it requires "appropriate measures to
ensure the protection of the unity of the families of migrant workers." 1 6
This right to family reunification has developed into a core feature of the
"paradigm shift" under the 2004 Law, and it is important to elaborate on
the contours of that protection.
The importance of family reunification under the 2004 Law is evident
in the number of prominent references to this right. Indeed, family unity is
listed as one of the overarching objectives of the law,1 7 as one of the core
protections in the immigrant bill of rights,iis and it is a basis for a waiver
of inadmissibility and cancelation of residence, even when an immigrant
has committed a crime.119
One example of how the right to family reunification influences
immigration policy can be found in the 2007 case Zhang, Hang, in which
the spouse of a Chinese resident in Argentina was denied a visa after she
allegedly tried to bribe a consular officer at the Argentine embassy in

Ill
112
113
114
115

Id. art. 11.
Id.
Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 10.
Id.

116 G.A. Res. 45/148, 1990, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (Dec. 18, 1990).
117 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 3(d) (Article 3(d) sets forth as an objective of the Law
to "guarantee the exercise of the of the right to family reunification.") (translation by author).
118 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 10 (Article 10, in the title "rights and liberties," orders
that "the State guarantee the right to family reunification of immigrants with their parents, spouses,
minor children, and children with disability whatever the age.") (translation by author).

119 See id. arts. 29, 62 (The last paragraph of Article 29 (inadmissibility) and Article 62
(cancellation of residence) contain the respective waiver provisions.)
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China.120 After the decision to deny admission was upheld on appeal, the
Argentine Supreme Court reversed, writing that "the new Argentine
immigration policy, Law 25.871, not only repealed the old law . .. but also
established . . . a substantial change in objectives that must be kept in mind
for the admission of foreigners." 1 2 1 The court rejected the government's

decision to deny the visa based on "criminal proclivity," holding such a
denial was incompatible with the 2004 Law, and that the principles of
family reunification must govern all admission decisions.122
There are also a number of cases that concern the eligibility of an
immigrant convicted of serious crimes for a waiver of the grounds of
criminal inadmissibility under article 29(c) of the 2004 Law. 123 One of the
most widely cited cases in this regard is Barrios Rojas, in which an
appeals court reviewed the expulsion order of a Peruvian woman who had

120 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
23/10/2007, "Zhang, Hang c. Estado Nacional-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto / recurso

de hecho," Fallos (2007-330-4554) (Arg.) (translation by author).
121 Id. at 4.
122 Id. at 5-6.
123 See, e.g., Cdmara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed.] [Federal Court of Appeals of
Salta], 9/3/2015, "Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Naci6n-Direcci6n

Nacional de Migraciones / Impugnaci6n de Acto Administrativo," Causa No. FSA 11000053/2012
(finding a man convicted of four years and eight months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on
account of the negative impact that would have on his three Argentine daughters); CAmara Federal de
Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of Salta], 13/03/2015, "Cerruto
Baleriano c. Ministerio del Interior de la Naci6n - Direcci6n Naci6nal de Migraciones / Amparo Ley
18.986," https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/C,%20B.pdf (finding a Bolivian woman
convicted of six years and five months should not be expelled on account of her three Argentina
children, husband and mother, all of whom resided in Argentina); Juzgado Contencioso
Administrativo
Federal
No. 3.
[la Inst.]
[Federal Administrative
Litigation Court],
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/EN,%20WL.pdf (finding a Peruvian man sentenced
to three years for identity fraud should not be expelled because the man had most of his family in
Argentina, he had no close family left in Peru, he had reformed his behavior after release from jail, and
had obtained a steady job); Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 5 [Ia Inst.] [Federal

Administrative Litigation Court], 12/8/2015, "C.C.R. c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/11 -DNM (expte.
Para
Juzgados,"
Directo
Recurso
/
808848/08)
Camara de Apelaciones
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(JCAF).pdf;
en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court of Appeals in Administrative

Litigation], sala 1, 1/9/2016, "C.C.R. c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/11 -DNM (expte. 308848/08) s/
Recurso

Directo

Para

https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(CNACAF).pdf

Juzgados,"

(finding a Bolivian

woman sentenced to four years and six months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account
of her Argentine husband and the child they had together); Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo

Federal No. 8 [la Inst.] [Federal Administrative Litigation Court], 2/5/2016, "Benavides Aguilar,
Mabel Leidy y Otro c. En-M Interior-RSL 1072/I l-DNM-RSL87560/09 (expt. 242169/08) / Recurso
Directo DNM," https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BA,%20ML.pdf (finding a Peruvian
woman sentenced to three years in prison for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account of the
fact that she was pregnant and currently lived with her boyfriend and his parents, and that her parents

and siblings also lived in Argentina).
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been convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to six years in prison. 124
Notably, this case concerned a Mercosur citizen, who would otherwise
benefit from the regularization plan described above.1 25 Upon review of
her application for residency, immigration authorities found that Zoyla
Cristina Barrios Rojas was inadmissible because of her crime, ordered her
expelled, and prohibited her readmission for fifteen years.126 An appeals
court reviewed the trial court's decision to deny her a waiver of
inadmissibility for "humanitarian reasons or family reunification" under
article 29. The appeals court held that the agency action must survive a
reasonableness test, and found the agency had exercised its discretion in a
manner that was unreasonable when considering Barrios Rojas's twenty
years of residence, marriage in Argentina, and her extensive family
connections in the country.127 Importantly, the court relied both on the
provisions of the 2004 Law, and also international human rights law on
family life and due process.128
The BarriosRojas case brings together a number of key considerations
with regard to the immigrant bill of rights. First, the case arises in the
context of a regularization plan that broadly promotes regional
migration. 129 Second, the case demonstrates how courts will balance the
provisions of the law that would serve as a basis for expulsion with the
humanitarian provisions of the law. In this regard, the case exemplifies a
broader trend in cases where an immigrant who has committed a crime is
not expelled because of considerations of family integrity. The case is
characteristic of a body of jurisprudence that is firmly rooted in
international human rights obligations that bind Argentina.
Finally, this case exemplifies the nexus between substantive rights and

124 Camara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court

of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2015, "Barrios Rojas, Zoyla Cristina c. EnDNM Resol 561/11 (exp. 2091169/06(805462/95)) y otro / recurso directo para juzgados,"
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BR,%20ZC.pdf,

at 1 (translation by author).

125 Id. at 2; see also Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25871, May 3, 2010, [318989]
B.O. art. 22(a)-(c); see also Hines, supra note 5, at 510 (citing Decree 616/2010 and explaining that
"temporary residents of the Mercosur are eligible for permanent residence after two years, while
temporary residents of other countries become eligible after three years.").
126 Cdmara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court
of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2015, "Barrios Rojas, Zoyla Cristina c. En-

DNM Resol 561/11 (exp. 2091169/06(805462/95)) y otro / recurso directo para juzgados," at 2.
127 Id. at 5-6.
128 Id. at 3-4.
129 See also Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art.
17 (requiring that immigration authorities issue dispositions to make immigration processes more
accessible, develop a specialized focus on regions of the country that merit such attention, and pursue
agreements with the public and private sector, as well as foreign governments with resident
populations in Argentina).
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the substantial procedural and judicial protections that were afforded to
Mrs. Barrios Rojas. Indeed, this was a case in which immigration
authorities exercised their discretion to prioritize the criminal provisions of
the law over family unity, and the matter had to arrive at a federal appeals
court to achieve the proper balancing of those considerations. In this
regard, it is an appropriate segue to a discussion of the law's procedural
and judicial protections.
2.

Proceduralandjudicialprotections

There are many layers of procedural and judicial protection envisioned
by-the 2004 Law, so as to guarantee that migrants have every opportunity
to regularize their status in Argentina and to defend themselves against
expulsion. As a preliminary matter, it is important to highlight the
requirement that immigration authorities must work to regularize the
situation of any irregular migrant. This initial period during which
immigration impediments are not enforced is important for two reasons.
First, it gives the migrant time to secure a lawyer, which the State will
provide for free if the migrant is indigent. Second, it gives the migrant
time to organize a defense.
The significance of this protection was evident in the Li Yun, Lingyan
Zheng, and Yu Junyun case discussed above, and was reiterated in 2011 in
a case called Dai Jianquing, and others.130 In Dai Jianquing, a court
ordered the release from detention of a group of Chinese women who had
attempted to enter Argentina clandestinely, and took the opportunity to
emphasize the significance of procedural protections in upholding the right
to migrate.' 3 ' The court reiterated that every migrant present in the
national territory must have the opportunity to regularize their situation
before being expelled.1 32 Moreover, the court highlighted that there were
procedures set forth for such regularization, and that a migrant has a right
to counsel provided by the State in confronting those procedures.13 3
Finally, the court recalled that detention of migrants was only appropriate
after an expulsion order had been issued, and that could only happen after
the migrant had been given the opportunity to regularize his or her status
with the assistance of counsel.1 34

130 Cdmara Federal de Apelaciones de Parand, 11/6/2011, "HC deducido por Dai Jianging, Lin
Xuehui, Xie Chenguang y Zhuang Bisheng," Causa No. 5-17.559-20.768/2011.
131 Id. at 8-9.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 6.
134 Id. at 7.
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The specific framework for this initial procedural opportunity to
regularize a migrant's status is set forth in the 2004 Law, and elaborated
upon in the 2010 Regulations to the law. Specifically, Title III of the 2004
Law that outlines the rules for entry and exit from the country requires that
DNM officials should assist irregular migrants in regularizing their status
when such persons come to their attention.1 35 The 2010 Regulations
provide a procedural framework for this process, and give an irregular
migrant thirty days to regularize her status after she is identified by the
DNM, with a possible thirty-day extension.136 Nevertheless, if the person's
immigration status is not regularized within the framework provided by
the law, the law requires that the DNM issue an expulsion order.1 37 As an
added protection, however, the law provides for the suspension of the
expulsion order issued, allowing for subsequent review by the appropriate
tribunal. 138

Next, the 2004 Law provides legal representation at the expense of the
State for all administrative actions that may lead to a denial of entry at the
border, a return to the country of origin, or expulsion from Argentina. 139
The 2010 Regulations instruct the DNM to refer all appropriate cases to
the Defense Division of the Public Ministry, 14 0 which has set up a
Commission on Migration with broad authority to intervene on behalf of
immigrants in administrative and judicial proceedings. 14 ' The 2010
Regulations provided the additional protection that suspends the process
while the migrant's appointed counsel makes contact and formulates a
defense. 142
Two seminal Argentine Supreme Court cases that elaborate the scope

135
136
137
138
139
140
141

The Law of 2004, supra note
Decree 616/2010, Regulation
The Law of 2004, supra note
Id.
Id. art. 86.
Decree 616/2010, Regulation
See
Resoluci6n

13, art. 61.
of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 61.
13, art. 61.

of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 86.
D.G.N.
No.
569/11,
13/5/
2011,

-

(providing
http://www.mpd.gov.ar/index.php/programas-y-comisiones/56-comision-del-migrante
authority to represent: "a) Detenidos a disposici6n de la justicia federal en procesos de expulsi6n (Ante
las Delegaciones de la Direcci6n Nacional de Migraciones de todo el Pais); b) Detenidos a disposici6n
de la justicia federal que se opongan a una expulsi6n (S61o respecto de los expediente administrativos
en tramite ante la Direcci6n Nacional de Migraciones - delegaci6n Ciudad Aut6noma de Buenos
Aires- ); c) Detenidos cuyo trdmite de expulsi6n devenga de una condena dictada por un Tribunal
Provincial y se opongan a su salida del pais (S61o respecto de los expediente administrativos en trimite
ante la Direcci6n Nacional de Migraciones - delegaci6n Ciudad Aut6noma de Buenos Aires); and d)
En los casos de personas cuya expulsi6n sea consecuencia de una irregularidad administrativa (S6lo
respecto de los expediente administrativos en tramite ante la Direcci6n Nacional de Migraciones
delegaci6n Ciudad Aut6noma de Buenos Aires- )).

142 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 86.
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of this right are Mabuza and Peralta Valiente,143 both of which concerned
unrepresented migrants who had missed the deadlines to appeal their
orders of expulsion. In these cases, the court found that the migrants'
rights had been violated because they had not been advised of their right to
appointed counsel, and had not benefitted from the defense of counsel at a
hearing.'" In Mabuza, the court further found that the DNM had the
obligation under the law to detect such due process violations and that it
should revoke an expulsion order in such circumstances.1 45 In Peralta
Valiente, the court recalled that the uneven playing field between migrants
and the DNM required such protection in order to uphold migrants' rights
to due process and judicial protection.'4
Notably, courts have also extended the same spirit of these protections
to cases in which migrants were represented by counsel. For example, in
DM, E, an appeals court reviewed a case in which appointed counsel for a
migrant made an untimely filing with the court, which had in turn denied
the case based on the untimely filing.1 47 The appeals court found that the
right to counsel required the lower court to reopen the proceeding in order
to give effect to the migrant's right to an adequate defense.1 4 8 In CA, EJ,
another appeals court extended this reasoning to a case where appointed
counsel was unable to contact a migrant to formulate a defense, and a trial
court denied an extension and ordered expulsion.1 49 The appeals court
considered that the law required appointed counsel to provide a defense,
and it was unreasonable to expect counsel to make a defense if the migrant
was unavailable.15 0 The appeals court insisted that the guarantee of access
to justice required a suspension of the procedural deadlines if the defense
counsel could not communicate with the migrant, and ordered that the

143 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 6/9/16,

"Mabuza Moses c. EN-DNM - Disp. 578/12 (Expte. 149957/10) / recurso directo DNM;" Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 26/4/2016, "Peralta
Valiente c. EN-M Interior - DNM / recurso directo DNM."
144 "Mabuza Moses," at 5-6; "Peralta Valiente", at 10.
145 "Mabuza Moses," at 7 (referring to Law No. 25.871. art. 90).
146 "Peralta Valiente," at 7-8.
147 Camara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court

-

of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2016, "Diop Matar, Elhadji c. EN-M Interior
DNM / recurso directo DNM," https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/DM,%20E.pdf.

148 Id. at 3-4.
149 Cimara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court

of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala 1, 13/9/2016, "Chein Alvarado, Errol James c. EN-M
recurso
/
Interior-DNM
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CA,%20EJ.pdf.

150 Id. at 4.

directo

DNM,"
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process should be reopened. 151
In addition to the right to judicial protection in the form of the right to
counsel, the 2004 Law includes a robust system of administrative and
judicial appeals. First, the law gives a right to administrative review of any
decision to deny entry at the border, cancel residence, order expulsion, or
levy a fine for an immigration-related infraction. 152 The review may come
in the form of a request for reconsideration from the immigration official
that issued an adverse decision, 5 3 or a request that the DNM review the
decision. 154 If the DNM denies the case on review, the migrant has the
right to either request an additional level of administrative review by the
Minister of the Interior,155 or finalize administrative review and make a
judicial appeal.156
The judiciary has authority to review the final administrative decision
to ensure that it complied with the requirements of legality, due process,
and reasonableness.157 An important line of cases in this regard are those
that exercised judicial review in cases denying residency under the article
29(c) criminal inadmissibility provision of the 2004 Law, and declining to
apply the waiver provision for reasons of family reunification. 58 In
considering whether a decision to uphold an order of expulsion is
reasonable, an appeals court may consider (1) the right to family
reunification; (2) the best interests of the child; and (3) criminal justice,
considering that expulsion for crimes may be construed as an additional
sanction, thereby violating the principle of ne bis in idem. 159 In other
words, the judiciary will review the reasonableness of a discretionary
administrative decision when it may result in an expulsion that is contrary

151 Id.
152 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 74 (translation by author).
153 Id. arts. 75-77 (describing the process for a request for reconsideration).
154 Id. art. 78 (describing the process for administrative review by the DNM,
"hierarchical" review).

called

155 Id. arts. 79, 81.
156 Id. arts. 79, 84.
157 Id. art. 89.
158 See, e.g., Camara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of
Salta], 9/3/2015, "Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Naci6n-Direcci6n
de
Acto
Administrativo,"
Migraciones
/
Impugnaci6n
Nacional
de
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/FH,%20DS.pdf; CAmara Federal de Apelaciones de
Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of Salta], 13/3/2015, "Cerruto Baleriano c. Ministerio
del Interior de la Naci6n - Direcci6n Naci6nal de Migraciones / Amparo Ley 18.986,"
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/C,%20B.pdf.
159 See "Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Naci6n-Direcci6n
Nacional de Migraciones / Impugnaci6n de Acto Administrativo," at 3 (ne bis in idem is more
commonly referred to as "double jeopardy" under American law).
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to the goals of the 2004 Law and its fundamental rights protections.160
During the process of administrative and judicial review, the detention
of migrants is only permitted in exceptional circumstances. The 2010
Regulations provide that the DNM must seek a judicial order to detain a
person in such cases, and that they must make a case for why the person
will not comply with administrative orders.161 Moreover, where the court
does issue a judicial order to permit detention, the law requires that the
DNM provide a report every ten days justifying continued detention.162
However, when the expulsion order is final, the 2004 Law does give
the authority to the DNM to detain the migrant for the sole purpose of
effectuating the expulsion order.163 A migrant may avoid such detention
with a guarantee that he will leave the country of his own accord.
Moreover, there is a fail-safe for detained persons who may challenge both
their detention and expulsion if they have established family ties to an
Argentine parent, child or spouse. 16 In such cases, the law provides for the
migrants' immediate release and access to a summary regularization
procedure.1 65

This last point emphasizes once again the interconnectedness between
the fundamental right to family reunification and procedural protections.
As illustrated by this discussion of the law itself, as well as the substantial
body of jurisprudence interpreting the scope of the law, these stand as two
pillars of protection of immigrant rights in Argentina. However, President
Macri took aim at both of these protections in his 2017 Decree, and the
effects on substantive and procedural rights have been substantially
deteriorated as a result. The following section discusses these
developments in detail.
III. RESTRICTIONIST REFORM AND THE ATTACK ON MIGRANTS' RIGHTS

On January 27, 2017, President Mauricio Macri issued Decree of
Necessity and Urgency ("DNU") 70, modifying Law 2004.166 The
President of Argentina is enabled under the constitution to issue such an
executive edict with legislative effect in circumstances in which there is
insufficient time, or it is otherwise impractical to legislate though the

160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 7.
Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 70.
Id.
The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 70.
Id.
Id.

166 DNU, supra note 1.
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normal process.' 67 Such a decree automatically becomes law and can only
be overturned if both chambers of the Argentine legislature oppose the
Nevertheless, this is a tool that has been used repeatedly by
change.'
Argentine Presidents over the last two decades, and legislative
intervention is rare.1 6 9 Accordingly, the Decree of Necessity and Urgency
has become a reliable means for Presidents to create national laws without
subjecting their initiatives to normal legislative scrutiny.
Macri's DNU 70 is generally considered to have broken with a decade
of rights-centered immigration policy in Argentina. 170 Perhaps in
recognition of this tradition, Macri framed the DNU in terms of human
rights. Indeed, he cited the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
recalling that the State has the sovereign prerogative to establish criteria
for admission and expulsion of non-citizens. 171 He further recognized that
the State must exercise that prerogative with full respect for human rights,
and suggested that it was inconsistent with due process protections to
172
subject non-citizens to lengthy immigration procedures.
In this way,
Macri recast the due process question in terms of timeliness rather than
robustness of appellate review, and he made the unprecedented claim that
lengthy immigration procedures constituted due process violations against
immigrants.
President Macri's attempt to couch his decree in the language of human
rights notwithstanding, a securitization rationale is evident in the DNU.
The President claimed that lengthy immigration procedures also interfered
with the enforcement of immigration laws, and therefore undermined
national security.1 73 He noted that procedures intended to last
approximately one year may last as long as seven years, enabling

167 Art. 99.3, CONSTITUCION NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (stating that "[o]nly when due to
exceptional circumstances the ordinary procedures foreseen by this Constitution for the enactment of
laws are impossible to be followed . . . he shall issue decrees on grounds of necessity and urgency . ..

168 Id.
169 Laura Capriata, Kirchner firmo cada seis dias un decreto de necesidad y urgencia, LA
NACION (April 13, 2008), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1003971-kirchner-firmo-cada-seis-dias-undecreto-de-necesidad-y-urgencia.
170 See Senate Debate, Feb. 16, 2017; see also Letter from Academics and Social Scientists to
the Senate and National Officials, Cientistas sociales convocan al Poder Legislativo a rechazar el DNU

70/2017 que modifica las Leyes de Migraciones (No 25.871) y de Nacionalidad y Ciudadania (No
346) (Feb. 28, 2017), http://blogs.ffyh.unc.edu.ar/antropologia/files/2014/1I/Cientistas-socialesrechazan-DNU-70-2017.pdf.
171 DNU, supra note 1, at 1-2.

172 Id. at 2.
173 Id. (citing the timeframes established under the 2004 Law supra note 13, and arguing that an
expulsion case would last approximately one year if an immigrant takes all administrative and judicial
recourses available to her).
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immigrants to prolong enforcement procedures while they take full
advantage of all of the appeals available to them. 174 Macri also cited a low
rate of expulsion orders executed out of the total number of expulsion
orders issued by the DNM arising from criminal convictions. 175 According
to Macri, this represented a public safety problem because there was a
high level of criminality among immigrants.1 76 Specifically, he claimed
that while immigrants only made up 4.5% of the Argentine population
overall, they made up more than 21% of the prison population, and that
33% of all persons incarcerated for drug crimes were immigrants. 7 7 Macri
justified reforming the 2004 Law though a Decree of Necessity and
Urgency with this narrative of endemic immigrant criminality unchecked
by an immigration system that failed to expeditiously expel criminal
immigrants.
Observers have offered responses both to Macri's assumptions and his
evidence, arguing that lengthy procedures are caused by delays on the part
of the State, and that Macri's statistics were manipulated to overrepresent
the proportion of immigrants in prison.17 8 The following discussion,
however, will focus on the legal provisions of the DNU, so as to
understand what exactly Macri achieved in legal terms. The goal of this
inquiry is to question the continued existence of a right to migrate in
Argentina, and it will engage this question though an analysis of the extent
to which the DNU has derogated from the norms established in the 2004
Law and reinforced by international human rights law. The final part will
review developments in the litigation to challenge the DNU, ongoing more
than a year after the decree came into effect, and pending before the
Argentine Supreme Court at the time of this writing.
A.

2017 Decree limitations on immigrant rights

The DNU makes a number of specific changes to the 2004 Law that
increase the circumstances in which people will be denied residency or
have their residency revoked, and it creates a summary expulsion
procedure for the expulsion of certain migrants that aggravates this
situation by making it difficult to defend the rights that remain. Notably,

174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 2-3.
177 DNU, supra note 1, Preamble.
178 See, e.g., Senado Argentina, Comision Bicameral Permanente de Trdmite Legislativo Ley
26.122, YOUTUBE (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yb307kKXtsY (comments by

Mariela Belski); see also id. (comments by Pablo Ceriani) (Feb 16, 2017).
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the DNU does not specifically amend the right to migrate or any of the
provisions of the immigrant bill of rights. However, modifications to the
procedural and judicial protections certainly affect the ability of migrants
to defend their rights in expulsion proceedings.
The DNU specifically addressed Macri's concerns about immigrants'
disproportionate involvement in criminal activity and their ability to
consistently evade expulsion because of extensive procedural protection.
First, the DNU expanded categories of crimes that make migrants either
inadmissible in the first instance or deportable after acquisition of
residency.179 Notably, this expansion of the range of crimes that have
immigration consequences does not require a conviction; rather, initial
criminal enforcement proceedings are enough to deem a migrant subject to
expulsion. The DNU also limits protection of the right to family
reunification of such persons.' 80 Second, the DNU routes migrants caught
in the new criminal immigrant dragnet into a summary expulsion
procedure that provides a very limited opportunity to defend themselves,
by limiting both their defenses as well as their opportunities for
administrative and judicial review.181 The following discussion reviews the
expansion of criminal grounds for expulsion, accompanied by a reduction
in procedural protection.
1.

Expanded criminalgroundsfor expulsion

The DNU creates very broad impediments for persons to acquire
residency if they have any criminal activity in their past, which ostensibly
prevents the regularization of these persons. Specifically, the DNU
modified article 29 of the 2004 Law that sets forth the grounds for
inadmissibility, and expanded the circumstances in which persons would
be declared inadmissible for certain criminal activity.'82 The 2004 Law
had barred entry of persons who were convicted or otherwise criminally
processed for trafficking in arms, drugs, or people; money laundering or
investment in illegal activity; or any crime that is punishable under
Argentine law with a deprivation of liberty of three years. 83 Indeed, many
of the cases discussed in the previous sections on the immigrant bill of
rights and accompanying procedural protections concerned persons who

179 See DNU, supra note 1, arts. 4 (substituting art. 29 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13), 6
(substituting art. 62 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13).

180 Id. arts. 4, 6.
181 See DNU, supra note 1, arts. 9, 10.

182 DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying art. 29 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13).
183 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 29(c).
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had initially been ordered expelled under article 29 of the 2004 Law.
The DNU drastically expanded article 29 by making inadmissible any
person who is convicted or otherwise criminally processed for any crime
that is punishable with a deprivation of liberty under Argentine law.' 85
Argentine criminal law provides for many offenses punishable with jail,18 6
including non-violent property crimes, 8 7 which can now lead to a denial
of residency and expulsion under Argentine immigration law.
Along with the expansion of the grounds for inadmissibility under
article 29, the DNU also placed limits on the substantive rights protections
enshrined in the 2004 Law. Specifically, while the 2004 Law included a
waiver provision that permitted exceptions to the criminal grounds of
inadmissibility in cases of family reunification or humanitarian concern,188
the DNU made the waiver unavailable for persons barred for criminal
activity punishable with three or more years in prison.1 89 Additionally,
while the 2010 Regulations provided that prior crimes would not trigger
inadmissibility under article 29 after ten years had passed,190 the DNU
replaced the text of the article without reincorporating that protection.
Arguably, then, the DNU eliminated this temporal limitation on the
immigration consequences of crimes.
The practical effect of these modifications is that a crime committed at
any time in the past can lead to a determination of inadmissibility, without
the consideration of any humanitarian or family-related concerns, if the
activity was punishable by three years in prison.' 9 ' Notably, nearly all the
cases discussed or cited in the prior discussion of the right to family unity
involved crimes punished with three or more years in prison. For example,

184 See supra note 123.
185 DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying art. 29 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13.
186 See generally CODIGO PENAL [COD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] arts. 79-313 (2011) (Arg.).
187 CODIGO PENAL [COD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 162 (1984) (Arg.) (providing that: "Seri
reprimido con prisi6n de un mes a dos aflos, el que se apoderare ilegitimamente de una cosa mueble,
total o parcialmente ajena.").
188 The 2004 Law, supranote 13, art. 29.
189 DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying Article 29).

190 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 29 (stating
that crime would expire, or "caducar" in Spanish, according to the rules set forth in article 51 of the
Penal Code, which provides that crimes punishable by a deprivation of liberty expire after 10 years;
see also CODIGO PENAL [COD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 51 (1984) (Arg.).
191 The DNU also creates a waiver provision for informants, which allows for exceptions from
the inadmissibility provisions for individuals who: (1) contribute to the prevention of the crime; (2)
clarify facts that are being investigated; (3) reveal the identities of perpetrators; (4) cause a significant
advance in an investigation; or (5) identify the whereabouts of instrumentalities or material evidence
of the crime. See DNU, supra note 1, art. 4. It is not clear from the text of the DNU whether persons
may benefit from this waiver even if the nature of their crime makes them ineligible for the
humanitarian waiver.
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Mrs. Barrios Rojas was sentenced to six years in prison for drug crimes. 192
Other cases involving three-year sentences, 193 or four-year sentences,1 94
also stand out as examples of cases in which courts overturned decisions
by the DNM to deny a family reunification waiver. Not only does the new
DNU regime contemplate the expulsion of migrants in this exact
circumstance, but Mrs. Barrios Rojas and others could now be subject to
cancelation of their residency under the DNU.
Indeed, the DNJ also modified provisions of the 2004 Law that
prescribed certain conduct that would trigger a cancelation of residency.
The 2004 Law provided grounds for the cancelation of residency that
overlapped in some measure with the grounds for inadmissibility,195

192 CAmara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal, Sala V, 31/03/2015,

/

"Barrios Rojas, Zoyla Cristina c. En-DNM Resol 561/11 (exp. 2091169/06(805462/95)) y otro

recurso directo para juzgados," https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BR,%20ZC.pdf; see
also CAmara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of Salta],
13/3/2015, "Cerruto Baleriano c. Ministerio del Interior de la Naci6n - Direcci6n Naci6nal de
Migraciones / Amparo Ley 18.986," https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/C,%20B.pdf
(finding that Bolivian woman convicted of six years and five months should not be expelled on
account of her three Argentina children, husband and mother, all of whom resided in Argentina).
193 See, e.g., Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 3 [la Inst.] [Federal
Administrative Litigation Court], 21/9/2015, "Encomenderos Noriega, Walter Luis c. En-M Interior-

DNM-DISP

2358/10

(expte.

225826/01)

Recurso

/

DNM,"

Directo

(finding that a Peruvian man
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/EN,%20WL.pdf
sentenced to three years for identity fraud should not be expelled because the man had most of his
family in Argentina, he had no close family left in Peru, he had reformed his behavior after relase from
jail, and had obtained a steady job); Juzgado en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 8 [la Inst.]
[Federal Administrative Litigation Court], 2/5/2016, "Benavides Aguilar, Mabel Leidy y Otro c. En-M

Interior-RSL

1072/11-DNM-RSL87560/09

(expt.

242169/08)

/

Recurso

Directo

DNM,"

https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BA,%20ML.pdf (finding that a Peruvian woman
sentenced to three years in prison for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account of the fact that
she was pregnant and currently lived with her boyfriend and his parents, and that her parents and
siblings also lived in Argentina).
194 See, e.g., Cimara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of
Salta], 9/3/2015, "Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Naci6n-Direcci6n
de
Acto
Administrativo,"
Impugnaci6n
s/
de
Migraciones
Nacional
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/FH,%20DS.pdf (finding that a man sentenced to four
years and eight months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account of the negative impact
that expulsion would have on his three Argentine daughters); Juzgado en 10 Contencioso

Administrativo Federal No. 5 [Ia Inst.] [Federal Administrative Litigation Court], 12/8/2015, "C.C.R.

Litigation], sala 1, 1/9/2016, "C.C.R. c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/ll-DNM (expte 308848/08)
Recurso

Directo

Juzgados,"

Para

https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(CNACAF).pdf

/

c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/1 1-DNM (expte 808848/08) / Recurso Directo Para Juzgados,"
Cimara de Apelaciones
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(JCAF).pdf;
en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court of Appeals in Administrative

(finding

that

a

Bolivian woman sentenced to four years and six months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on
account of her Argentine husband and the child they had together).

195 See, e.g., The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 62(e) (expressly incorporating Article 29(d) and
(e) ground for inadmissibility as grounds for cancelation of residency).
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providing for such cancelation where a resident was convicted of a crime
and sentenced to five or more years of imprisonment, or was convicted of
repeated criminal offenses.1 96 The 2004 Law included some important
legal protections in this regard. First, it required immigration authorities to
wait two years after the completion of the sentence before canceling
residency. 19 7 Second, it provided immigration authorities with a thirty-day
window to initiate the cancelation proceeding, or forfeit the right to do
so.' 98 The 2004 Law also included a provision that waived the cancelation
of residency of a parent, child, or spouse of an Argentine citizen, unless
immigration authorities are able to provide support for their decision under
the law.199 In essence, the 2004 Law protected migrants from cancelation
of their residency by requiring that the conduct that triggered cancelation
be egregious, by placing the onus on the State to initiate the cancelation
procedure in a tight timeframe, and by including a generous protection for
families.
The DNlJ substantially alters all of these protections and creates a
framework that greatly facilitates the cancelation of immigrants'
residency. First, the DNU provides that any crime, committed in Argentina
or abroad, that may be punished with a deprivation of liberty under
Argentine law, will trigger a cancelation of residency. 200 Further, the DNU
provides that the conviction of such a crime will automatically cancel the
residency, no matter how long the immigrant has held the residency, and
that expulsion will automatically follow. 201 Finally, the DNU limits the
extent to which an immigrant can challenge their expulsion on family
202
The waiver
reunification grounds by creating a limited waiver.
limitations are threefold: (1) it is only available to a person whose
sentence does not exceed three years; (2) it may only be invoked if the
family relationship is to a parent, child or spouse; and (3) it is unavailable
if the person has withdrawn financial support for the relevant family
member.20 3
The provisions of the DNU both limit the possibility for certain

196
197
198
199

The 2004 Law, supranote 13, art. 62(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.

200 DNU, supra note 1, art. 6 (creating a new Article 62(c)).

201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. While the DNU emphasizes that this is the only waiver for the expulsion of criminal
immigrants, it does provide a fail-safe in stating that such expulsion may not violate the national law
on refugee protection. Id. (referencing Law 26.165 on the protection of refugees).
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immigrants to regularize their situation, and limit the recourse against
immigration restrictions based on family ties. Moreover, there exists a
connection between the harshening of legal provisions that govern the
admission and residence of migrants, and a new summary expulsion
procedure that was created by the DNU.
2.

The procedurefor summary expulsion

The extent of the procedural modifications made by the DNJ is quite
staggering, and when read together they largely nullify the 2004 Law's
protections for persons against whom criminal proceedings have been
initiated. As an initial matter, the DNU provides that all decisions about
the limited family reunification or humanitarian waivers mentioned above
belong to immigration authorities, and there is no recourse to the courts in
the event that such waivers are denied. 20 Indeed, the DNU goes as far as
to strip the judiciary of the competency to waive the provisions of the law
that deny admission or cancel the residency of anyone who has engaged in
criminal activity that could be punished with jail. 205 This makes the
discretionary power of the immigration authorities in such cases nearly
complete, and harkens back to the Videla Law era.
The effects of this jurisdiction stripping provision are substantial.
Indeed, the majority of cases reviewed in the sections above on the
immigrant bill of rights and judicial and procedural protections concerned
a decision not to waive grounds for inadmissibility for family reunification
or humanitarian reasons. 206 Accordingly, under the new DNJ regime,
these cases would have resulted in expulsion. In fact, all of the migrants
who obtained their residency in those cases could now have cancelation of
residency proceedings initiated against them, and the exact same criminal
grounds that were waived previously under judicial review would not be
subject to review under the new regime.
Perhaps the most significant change to the procedural protections in the
2004 Law was the DNU's addition of a new chapter establishing a
11,,207
The scope of the summa'ry
special summary migration procedure.
expulsion procedure is broad, in that it applies to all cases of
inadmissibility, and most cases of cancelation of residency, and in

204 DNU, supra note 1, art. 7.
205 Id.; but see supra note 203 (referencing Law 26.165 on the protection of refugees).
206 See cases cited supra note 123.
207 DNU, supra note 1, art. 9 (creating Chapter I Bis of Title V, and titling the new chapter: "Del
Procedimiento Migratorio Especial Sumarismo").
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208

particular those arising from criminal provisions.
This new procedure, that will provide the framework for the vast
majority of expulsion proceedings in Argentina moving forward, delivers
on its promise of summary consideration. Indeed, once a proceeding
initiates to exclude or expel an immigrant, such person has three days to
request information from the government in order to prepare a defense,
and just two days if the government decides to detain the person. 20 9 The
DNU provides an additional three days to review the charges against the
immigrant. 210 After the passage of these deadlines, the immigration officer
decides the case, and if it is an adverse decision, the DNU provides just
three days to make an administrative appeal to immigration authorities. 211
Once the appeal is resolved, or the three-day deadline for appeal expires,
212
the administrative process concludes.
Notably, the DNU prohibits the
213
extension of any of these deadlines.
To the extent that an adverse decision may be appealed to the
judiciary,214 the law provides three days to file an appeal with the DNM,
which then has three days to forward the appeal and its response to the
215
appropriate court.
The court of first instance has one day to determine
whether the case has been appropriately filed, and may reject the case for
216
want of jurisdiction as a preliminary matter.
After jurisdiction is
established, the court of first instance has three days to issue a final
decision.2 17 An adverse decision by the court of first instance must be
appealed to the appropriate appeals court in three days, and the appeals
court has three days to issue its own decision in the case.218 The appeals
court decision is final, as motions to reconsider or further appeals are
prohibited.219

208 DNU, supra note 1, art. 10 (including in the scope all grounds of inadmissibility in Articles

29(a)-(k), and cancelation of residency Articles 62(a), (b), (c), and (f), which are the provisions
relating to immigration fraud and all criminal bases for cancellation).
209 DNU, supra note 1, art. 12 (establishing Article 69 ter., which sets forth timeframes for
documents request in subsections (a)-(c)).

210 DNU, supra note 1, art. 13.
211 DNU, supra note 1, art. 14.

212 Id.
213 DNU, supra note 1, art. 10.
214 As discussed above, the DNU strips the judiciary of the competency to waive the provisions
of the law that deny admission or cancel the residency of anyone who has engaged in criminal activity
that could be punished with jail, therefore these matters are not appealable. See supra note 205.

215
216
217
218

DNU, supra note 1, art. 16.
Id.
Id.
DNU, supra note 1, art. 18.

219 DNU, supra note 1, art. 19; see also DNU, supra note 1, art. 26 (deleting the provision for
reconsideration from the 2004 Law. supranote 13).
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While the DNU retains the right to counsel at the expense of the State
on its face, it places the burden on the immigrant in expulsion proceedings
to request an attorney. 22 0 The DNU further dictates whether someone
qualifies for counsel at the expense of the State, and if a case is referred to
the public defender's office, the DNJ provides the defense lawyer three
days to respond to the charges in the expulsion proceeding.221
In addition to substantially speeding up expulsion procedures, and
limiting procedural protections as a matter of fact and law, the DNU
loosens restrictions on immigration detention. First, the DNU extends the
allowable period of post-order detention from a maximum of thirty
days,222 to thirty days renewable by judicial order for thirty-day periods,
and without a firm outward limit. 223 Further, the DNU limits the family
reunification fail-safe against detention,224 by referring such claims back
into the limited waiver procedures created by the DNU and described
above.225
Subtler, though equally troubling, is the evident encouragement in the
DNU for the expanded use of detention before an expulsion order is final.
Indeed, while the DNU retains the language that pre-order detention
should be "exceptional," it provides that immigration authorities may seek
detention at the initiation of the summary expulsion procedure in order to
facilitate the ultimate execution of the expulsion order.226 This
simultaneously communicates the idea that expulsion is inevitable in such
summary proceedings, and that detention is an important tool to ensure
this outcome. It further emphasizes that the DNM may make a detention
227
request at any point in an administrative or judicial proceeding.
Finally,
the DNU provides that that the DNM may seek the detention of an
immigrant in the context of the review of the expulsion order before a
court, and that it need not initiate a separate proceeding to authorize
detention. 228
Immigrant rights advocates expressed alarm at the passage of the DNU,
manifesting concerns about the President's demonization of immigrants,

220 DNU, supra note 1, art. 24.

221 Id.
222 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 70
(allowing for a judicial detention order of fifteen days to carry out an expulsion, which was renewable
one time for fifteen days).
223 DNU, supra note 1, art. 21.

224 The 2004 LaA, supra note 13, art. 70.
225 DNU, supra note 1, art. 21.
226 DNU, supra note 1, art. 11.

227 Id.
228 DNU, supra note 1, art. 17.
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229

as well as the substantial reduction in legal protections for migrants.
One group of rights advocates filed a collective action challenging the
legality of the DNU, which has provided a framework to think about the
230
widespread changes that are under way.
B. Litigation to challenge the 2017 Decree
As provided in the Argentine Constitution, the legislative debate on the
DNU began in earnest within weeks of its issuance, 231 but the legislature
did not conclude the debate nor did it take a final vote on the Decree.
Recognizing the absence of political will, prominent civil society
organizations ("petitioners") in Argentina filed a legal challenge against
232
arguing that it violated the Argentine Constitution and
the Decree,
human rights treaty obligations with constitutional hierarchy.23 3 The
petitioners argued that the DNU exceeded the limits of presidential power
234
and that the DNU interfered with access to
defined by the constitution,
justice and the right to a defense, impeded access to free legal counsel at
the expense of the State,236 and violated the right to family reunification.237
First, the petitioners argued that the Supreme Court had interpreted the
constitution to permit a decree of necessity and urgency only when: (1) it
is impossible for the legislature to convene, or (2) "exceptional
circumstances" require immediate action that cannot be accomplished
238
through the regular legislative process.28 With regard to the justification
provided by the President for the DNU, the petitioners argued that the
President's comparison of the percentage of immigrants in Argentina
(4.5%) with the percentage of immigrants in federal penitentiaries for drug
crimes (33%) was misleading. 239 They argued that it was more appropriate
to consider the entire population of people jailed for violations of the

229 See infra, Sec. Il.b.
230 See infra, Sec. Il.b.
231 See, e.g., Senado Argentina, Comision Bicameral Permanente de Trdmite Legislativo Ley
26.11, supra note 178.
232 The petitioners included the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Comision

Argentina para los Refugiados y Migrantes (CAREF), and Colectivo por la Diversidad (COPADI). See
Amparo Colectivo contra Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia (DNU) 70/2017 [hereinafter Collective
Action] (on file with author) (translation by author).

233
234
235
236
237
238
239

Collective Action §§ VIII-XII.
See id. § VII.1.a
See id. § VIII - IX.
See id. § VIII.
See id. § XI.
See id. § VII1.La.
See id
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controlled substances law,240 including both provincial and federal
facilities, and that the immigrants represented only 17% of that carceral
population.241 Further, they highlighted that immigrants made up only 6%
242
of the entire carceral population, without regard for the crime at issue.
The petitioners argued that by presenting the statistics he did, President
Macri intended to misrepresent the nature of the alleged problem of
immigrant criminality in order to justify his emergency use of the
exceptional power bestowed on his office by the Argentine Constitution.243
Another argument focused on the constitution's prohibition against
usinp the decree of necessity and urgency in matters concerning criminal
taxes,245 or elections and political parties.246 Specifically, the
law,
petitioners argued that the expansion of criminal grounds for expulsion
created a situation in which a person who served time for a crime could
then be deprived of their liberty for an immigration infraction for an
247
extended period of time in relation to the prior crime. By extending the
criminal law punishment through expulsion and detention, the petitioners
argued that the DNU modified criminal law and therefore should declared
248
invalid as violative of the constitution.
Next, the petitioners argued that the DNU violated minimum standards
of due process and access to justice by imposing a summary expulsion
procedure that violated fundamental rights to adequate procedure and
freedom from arbitrary detention. 24 9 Specifically, they argued that the
short timeframes in which migrants were expected to prepare and present a
defense against expulsion created an "illusory" process, inasmuch as it
would be impossible for any migrant to respond adequately in the time
provided.250 Further, petitioners argued that this summary expulsion
procedure was accompanied by increased authority to subject migrants to
preventative detention in violation of their right to freedom of

240 Law No. 23737, Oct. 11, 1989, [26737] B.O. 4 (Arg.) amends the penal code and sets forth a
wide variety of controlled substances crimes and the punishments for those crimes.
241 See Collective Action, supra note 233, § VII.L.a.

242
243
244
245
246
247

See
See
See
See
See
See

id
id
id
id
id
id

§ VII.2.
§ VII.3.
§ VII.2.a.
§ VII.2.b.

248 See id § VII.2.c (suggesting that the distinction between the migratory policy and the
criminal sections appears hazy).

249 See id § VIII.
250 See id. §VIII.l.
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251
movement.
Moreover, they argued that the restrictions on access to
counsel, administrative review, and judicial review aggravated this
problem and unduly limited access to justice.252
The petitioners further argued that limitations on the right to counsel
violated basic legal protections.2 53 Specifically, they identified provisions
that required a migrant to explicitly request publicly provided counsel, and
254
In the event
demonstrate their economic need in order to secure counsel.
that the immigrant does not expressly request counsel and/or fails to prove
sufficient economic necessity to warrant assigned counsel, the time
continues to run on the procedural deadlines, leaving them at grave risk of
255
Under the
missing their opportunity to challenge an expulsion order.
2004 Law, all procedural deadlines were suspended until the defense
counsel entered an appearance,256 whereas by shifting the burden onto the
immigrant to invoke a right to counsel and prove a need, the DNU
virtually assured that poor migrants would go without counsel.257
Finally, the petitioners highlighted with grave concern limits that the
DNU placed on the right to family reunification. 2 58 They highlighted that
the 2004 law itself protected the right to family reunification, and that this
right under the law was reinforced by various international human rights
obligations. 2 59 By denying many migrants in expulsion proceedings the
ability to allege family reunification as a means to acquire residency, or
for courts to review these arguments on appeal, the DNU left this
fundamental right to the discretion of immigration officials. 2 60 This
process was further burdened by additional requirements to demonstrate
qualifying familial relationships.2 6 1
Later that year, Federal Prosecutor Miguel A. Gilligan exercised his
authority to issue an advisory opinion on the matter.262 In it, Gilligan
responded to each of the petitioners' arguments in turn. First, he concluded

251
252
253
254
255
256
257

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. § X.
id. § VIII.1-3.
id. § VIII.3.
id
id.
id.
id.

258 See Collective Action, supra note 233, § XI.

259 See id.
260 See id.
261 See id.
262 Advisory Opinion of Miguel A. Gilligan, Federal Prosecutor, National Public Ministry, on
"Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN (expte. no. 3061/2017) / Amparo Ley 16.986,
Juzgado No. 1, Secretaria No. 1, (Sept. 19 2017), https://www.fiscales.gob.ar/fiscalias/pidieron-quese-declare-la-inconstitucionalidad-parcial-del-dnu-que-modifico-la-ley-de-migraciones/.
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263

and then
that the DNU was not barred by the criminal law exception,
that it did meet the standard for "necessity and urgency." 264 Second, with
regard to the substance of the DNU, he identified the need to identify
those rights that were appropriately vindicated though a collective legal
challenge of this nature.265 He found that issues relating to access to
justice, such as the procedural alterations and the right to a defense, were
266
while issues concerning the right to family reunification and
collective,
freedom from arbitrary detention were individual, and not appropriately
267
raised in this litigation.
Gilligan went on to examine the due process and judicial protection
challenges raised in the litigation.268 He provided an extensive discussion
of the international human rights obligations that bind Argentina, in
particular articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human
Rights.269 He emphasized State obligations to eliminate obstacles to a
defense,270 provide adequate time to prepare a defense, 271 and ensure

sufficient time to collect evidence to support a case.272 Gilligan concluded
that the three-day deadline for both the administrative and judicial appeals
and the requirement that a migrant invoke her right to counsel violated
Argentina's human rights obligations.273
In October 2017, the trial court issued its decision on the collective
action against the DNU, rejecting all of the petitioners' arguments except
one.274 First, the court agreed with Gilligan that the challenges to the
family reunification provisions were matters that must be taken up in
individual cases, and therefore declined to address the merits of those
claims.2 75 Second, the court found that the DNU was not prohibited under
the criminal law exclusion, and further said that it was still under
consideration by the Senate, which was the appropriate body to determine

263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

28.
34.
38.
43.
47-48.
49-72.
56.
53.
54-55.
55.

273 Id. at 59, 69-70.
274 Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 1 [la Inst.] [Federal Administrative
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo

Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017),"
https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf
275 Id. at 3-4.
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whether it was duly issued.276
Third, the court specifically disagreed with Gilligan and found the
summary expulsion procedure and the detention provisions of the DNU to
be reasonable and consistent with Argentina's obligations under
international law.277 With regard to the summary expulsion procedure, the
court emphasized that nothing in human rights law contradicted the
sovereign right of Argentina to regulate the entry and exit of non-citizens
278
into its territory. In terms of whether the process set forth in the DNU
was too abbreviated, the court found that it was not when compared to
other speedy judicial measures under Argentine law. 279 With regard to the
detention provisions, the court understood the need for detention in order
to effectuate expulsion, and found that the time limits and judicial
protections established in the DNU were reasonable.280
Finally, the court took up the petitioners' argument regarding the DNU
requirement that a migrant in expulsion proceedings invoke her right to
counsel at the expense of the State. The court emphasized that Argentina
has the clear obligation to guarantee defense counsel to indigent migrants,
and that it was highly unlikely that it could meet this obligation in the
summary expulsion procedure without specifically informing the migrant
of her right to counsel.28 Accordingly, the court ordered that the DNU
should be modified to require the State to inform any indigent migrant
facing expulsion or cancelation of residency of her right to counsel
provided by the State.282
The petitioners appealed the decision of the trial court to a chamber of
the administrative appeals court, and received an opinion that vindicated
all of their claims.283 Three appeals court judges issued separate opinions,
each validating some of the petitioners' arguments, and together nullifying
the DNU as unconstitutional.
First, Judge Jorge Federico Alemany found error in the trial court's
decision that the DNU's provisions on summary expulsion, detention, and
family reunification did not violate the constitution. Judge Alemany first

276 Id. at 7.
277 Id. at 12 (finding on summary expulsion procedure), 15 (finding on detention).

278 Id. at 12.
279 Id. (referencing habeas corpus, the amparo action, and a summary criminal procedure).

280 Id. at 14-15.
281 Id. at 16.
282 Id. at 16, 17-18.
283 CAmara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c.

EN-DNM

/ Amparo

Ley

16.986

(expte.

no.

content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf.

3061/2017),

https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-
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found that the three-day deadline for submitting administrative and
judicial appeals was insufficient to guarantee the fundamental due process
rights.284 Next, the Judge found that the new detention framework
permitted detention for the duration of expulsion proceedings, which
violated protections against arbitrary detention.28 5 Finally, the Judge found
that the DNU's jurisdiction stripping provisions that prevented the review
of the DNM's decision to deny family reunification waivers violated
clearly established human rights protections.286
Second, Judge Guillermo F. Tracey found error in the trial court's
decision that the DNU met the constitutional standard for "necessity and
urgency." The Judge began by elaborating the constitutional standard for
exceptional circumstances that justified the issuance of legislation without
287
The Judge then reviewed the factual allegations
congressional action.
set forth in the DNIJ that expulsion proceedings were not leading to actual
expulsions, and that immigrants were overrepresented in the carceral
population in Argentina. 288 The Judge then reviewed official government
statistics, and found not only that there had been no increase in the
proportion of non-citizen inmates, but that the percentage of immigrants in
prison had actually dropped in 2016.289 The Judge concluded that the DNU
failed to meet the constitutional standard for "necessity and urgency." 290
The third judge, Pablo Gallegos Fedriani, joined the opinion of Judge
Treacy, providing a majority that declared the DNU unconstitutional
because it failed to provide the requisite exceptional circumstances that
permit the President to legislate under the constitution.2 91 Judge Gallegos
further elaborated his perspective, not shared by the other two judges, that
the DNU should be declared unconstitutional pursuant to the subject
292
matter limitation on decrees that modify criminal law.
Summary
expulsion proceedings conducted while a person was detained, he
reasoned, were administrative sanctions analogous to criminal punishment
and therefore inappropriate matters to regulate through a decree of
necessity and urgency.

284 Id. voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, sec. X.

285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293

Id. sec. XI.
Id. sec. XII.
Id. voto Judge Guillermo F. Treacy, see. V.2.
Id. sec. V.4.
Id.
Id.
Id. voto Pablo Gallegos Fedriani, sec. I.
Id. sec. V.
Id.
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All three appeals court judges relied heavily on international human
rights law and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights,294 as had the trial court judge29 5 and Macri himself in issuing the
296
DNU.
It is evident from the litigation thus far that human rights law will
be of fundamental importance in resolving any challenge to the DNU.
Moreover, as expulsions continue to take place under the auspices of the
DNU during the pendency of the Supreme Court appeal, individuals must
challenge the application of the Decree in their cases as violations of the
right to family reunification, protections again arbitrary detention, and
other procedural violations. The DNJ has undoubtedly cast a shadow over
the right to migrate in Argentina, but core human rights protections may
yet serve to reinforce this concept and defend the immigrant rights
achievements of the last decade.

IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS REINFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE

The essence of the paradigm shift that occurred in Argentina with the
right to migrate is best captured by the cases of unauthorized migrants at
the border who were released from detention and provided with a lawyer
297
The DNU regime places such
and time to regularize their status2.
migrants directly into summary expulsion procedure and facilitates the
decision to detain them while the expulsion orders issue, and thus could
easily be considered to have ended the era of the right to migrate. It is still
too early, however, to write the obituary of this novel right, and while
signs point towards the hardening of Argentina immigration enforcement,
a legal framework for the protection of the right to migrate is still available
to Argentine courts.
Most notably, the prominence of international human rights protections
under Argentine law inspires hope for the perseverance of right to migrate.
However, while human rights law conceptualizes rights as inherent to the
human person, and limits state action with regard to such rights, a wellestablished norm of international law guarantees states authority to create

294 Id. at 6, 47-49.
295 Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. I [la Inst.] [Federal Administrative
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo

3061/2017),"
no.
(expte.
16.986
Ley
https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf

12,

296 DNU, supra note 1, at 1-2.

297 Cimara Federal De Apelaciones de Parana [CFed.], 10/12/2004, "Ali Yun, Lingyan Zheng y
Yu Junyun / habeas corpus," L.S. Crim. (2004-11-396) (Arg.); Camara Federal de Apelaciones de

Parana [CFed.], 11/6/2011, "HC deducido por Dai Jianqing, Lin Xuehui, Xie Chenguang y Zhuang
Bisheng," Causa No. 5-17.559-20.768/2011.
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rules to regulate entry and exit from their national territory. Indeed, Macri
cited this principle in the opening considerations of the DNU, as did the
trial court and the court of appeals in the DNU litigation.298 While Macri
overstated the support that international human rights law provides for his
DNU, it is important to recognize a tension in international human rights
law at the outset of this analysis.
This tension is present in the very foundational documents that
establish the universal and regional systems of human rights that bind
Argentina. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration) and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (American Declaration) 299 leave states wide latitude in matters of
immigration regulation by articulating the freedom of movement as the
rights to circulate within a state, leave a state, and enter one's own statenotably excluding any right of entry into any other state.3 0 Similarly, the
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals
of the Country in Which They Live sets forth broad human rights
protections for migrants, 301 but prefaces those protections with the
following:
Nothing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as legitimizing the
illegal entry into and presence in a State of any alien, nor shall any
provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to
promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and
the terms and conditions of their stay or to establish differences
between nationals and aliens ...
While it is true that these foundational human rights documents suggest
that the protections they articulate will not limit sovereign authority in
matters of immigration regulation, a number of important norms of

298 See cases cited supra notes 274, 283.

299 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6, at 17 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. I [hereinafter American
Declaration].
300 Universal Declaration, supra note 299, art. 13 (stating specifically that: "(1) [e]veryone has
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state;" and "(2) [elveryone
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country"); American
Declaration, supra note 299, art. VIII. (stating specifically, that "[e]very person has the right to fix his
residence within the territory of the state of which he is a national, to move about freely within such
territory, and not to leave it except by his own will").
301 G.A. Res. 40/144, United Nations Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are

Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live (Dec. 13, 1985), arts. 5-10.
302 Id. art. 2.1.
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protection have evolved in human rights law. The two sections that follow
will explore immigrant rights norms that protect family life from arbitrary
state interference and guarantee due process, and judicial protection in the
context of immigration regulation and enforcement. Each of these
protections is enshrined in Argentine law in a variety of ways, and they
represent some of the clearest lines of defense of the right to migrate.
A.

Defending the right to family reunification

The protection of the family is prominent in the Universal Declaration,
which established both the right to create a family, and the imperative to
protect the family as the "natural and fundamental group unit of
society." 303 In the immigration context, the right to family life provides
both the basis for a right to migrate for purposes of family reunification as
well a family unity defense against the expulsion of migrants, and
therefore limits state authority with regard to the regulation of entry and
residence of migrants.304 The right to family life was reiterated in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),30 s and the
Human Rights Committee ("IHRC") has interpreted that right as including
"the adoption of appropriate measures . . . to ensure the unity or
reunification of families, particularly when their members are separated
for political, economic or similar reasons." 30 6 The HRC has extended this
protection to the immigration context, announcing limits on state
discretion over the terms of entry and residence of migrants.3 07
Specifically, the HRC has resolved a number of individual cases
involving the right to family life as a defense against expulsion.308

303 Universal Declaration, supra note 299, art. 16; see also Universal Declaration, supra note
299, art. 12 (providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.").
304 Vincent Chetail, The TransnationalMovement of Persons Under General InternationalLawMapping the Customary Law Foundations ofInternationalMigration Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MIGRATION 41-42, (Vincent Chetail ed., 2014).

305 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 17, 23, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
306 39th UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 19: art. 23 (The Family)
Protectionof the Family, the Right to Marriageand Equality of the Spouses, ¶ 5 (July 27, 1990).
307 27th UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position ofAliens
Under the Covenant, 1 5 (Apr. I1, 1986) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15] (stating that "[t]he
Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party ....
However, in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation
to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of... respect for family life arise").
308 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee, Gonzalez v. Republic of Guyana,

CCPR/C/98/D/1246/2004 (2010); UN Human Rights Committee, Dauphin v. Canada, A/64/40 vol. II,
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Examples drawn from the Western Hemisphere are particularly telling. In
Gonzalez v. Republic of Guyana, the HRC found that Guyana's refusal to
process a Cuban citizen's marriage-based naturalization due to potential
political repercussions in the bilateral relations between the two countries
constituted a violation of the right to family life.309 In Dauphin v. Canada,
the HRC concluded that the expulsion of a Haitian man, who had lived in
Canada since the age of two and whose parents and siblings were all
310
Canadian citizens,
constituted a violation of the right to family life,
notwithstanding a conviction for robbery with violence which earned him
a thirty-three month sentence.3 11
The American Declaration mirrors the Universal Declaration in its
protections of the family, including the right to form a family, 312 as well as
a protection against abusive attacks by the state against the family. 313 In
Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, the InterAmerican Commission found that these obligations under the American
Declaration constrained the authority of the United States to expel
individuals from its territory.3 14 The Inter-American Commission relied, in
part, on the authority of the HRC referenced above, as well as the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 1 in concluding
that the United States was required to consider the effects of expulsion on
the families of Mr. Smith and Mr. Armendariz. 316 Where the United States
had failed to consider these effects, due to drug crimes committed by Mr.
Smith and Mr. Armendariz, the Commission found that it had violated

Annex VII.SS 427 (2009); UN Human Rights Committee, Madafferi v. Australia, Communication No.

1011/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/8 1/D/101 1/2001 (2004).
309 UN Human Rights Committee, Gonzalez v. Republic of Guyana, CCPR/C/98/D/1246/2004
(2010) ¶ 14.4 (2010).
310 UN Human Rights Committee, Dauphin v. Canada, A/64/40 vol. II, Annex VII.SS T 8.2
(2009).
311 Id. 19. Similarly, the HRC found that the expulsion of an Italian man who had overstayed his
tourist visa in Australia and married an Australian citizen and had four children would violate his right
to family life, even though he had a criminal conviction in Italy that led to a conclusion that he had
"bad character." UN Human Rights Commission, Madafferi v. Australia, Communication No.

1011/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 TT 2.1-2.4, 9.8 (2004).
312 American Declaration, supra note 299, art. VI (establishing that "[e]very person has the right
to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection thereof').
313 American Declaration, supra note 299, art. V (establishing that "[e]very person has the right
to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and

family life").
314 Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.
H.R., Report N. 81/10 (2010), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/merits.asp.

315 Id. IT 52-54.
316 Id. T 60.
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right to family life and judicial protection. 1 The
considered the children left behind when the United
Smith and Mr. Armendariz, and found the United
its obligation to consider the best interests of the

child."s
The strength of the protection of family life is arguably at its apex
when the interests of children are concerned. The main UN instrument in
this regard is the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), which
sets forth the principles that a child should not be separated from her
family against her will, unless it is in her best interest."' The CRC
expounds on this right with reference to "applications by a child or his or
her parents to enter or leave a State Party for purposes of family
reunification," and requires that such requests are dealt with in a "positive,
humane, and expeditious manner." 320 While this guarantee is procedural in
nature, it suggests favorable treatment of such requests. Moreover, the
near universal ratification of this instrument suggests that such principles
may be on their way to attaining the status of customary international
321
In fact, some scholars have argued that a customary norm exists to
law.
facilitate the reunification of a nuclear family of documented migrants.322
In its Advisory Opinion 21 ("AO-21"), the Inter-American Court
provided guidance on the specific question of the scope of protection for
children in cases in which one or both parents might be subjected to
expulsion due to their migratory status.323 In that opinion, the court began
with a conceptual clarification that it understands family to encompass
more than a child's parents for purposes of protection under the right to
family unity, and that a State has the obligation to determine the
composition of a child's family unit in each case.324 The court
acknowledged the tension that exists between the State's right to regulate

317 Id.

318 Id.
319 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
320 Id. art. 10(1).
321 Chetail, supra note 304, at 46.
322 Id. at 43. While this position is certainly contested, more have coalesced around the
proposition that a state is required to reunite a minor child with her family legally residing in a state's
territory. Id. at 44.
323 Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration And/or in Need of
International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 21, 1 263 (Aug.

19, 2014) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-21/14] (specifically reviewing this question with
reference to Articles 8, 17, 19 and 25 of the American Convention and Articles VI and XXV of the
American Declaration).

324 Id. 11272.
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entry and exit of non-citizens and it obligations to afford special protection
to children, and emphasized that every exercise of the State's right must
comply with the requirements of (a) suitability; (b) necessity, and (c)
proportionality. 325
Specifically with regards to proportionality, the court indicated that
because it will never be in the best interest of a child to be separated from
her parent through expulsion, "the State concerned has the obligation to
weigh, adequately and strictly, the protection of the family unit against the
legitimate interests of the State."326 Among other considerations, the court
requires a state to weigh: (a) the duration of stay and extent of ties of the
person to be expelled; (b) the nationality, residency, and custody of the
child if expulsion takes place; (c) the scope of harm to the family unit; and
(d) the scope of disruption to the child's daily life.327 Importantly, the
court found that in cases where a child is a citizen or permanent resident of
the host country, "it is axiomatic that the child must conserve the right to
continue enjoying her or his family life in said country and, as a
component of this, mutual enjoyment of the cohabitation of parents and
children." 328 The court concluded that:
[T]he rupture of the family unit by the expulsion of one or both
parents due to a breach of immigration laws related to entry or
permanence is disproportionate in these situations, because the
sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to family life, which
may have repercussions on the life and development of the child,
appears unreasonable or excessive in relation to the advantages
obtained by forcing the parent to leave the territory because of an
administrative offense.3 29
In perhaps the most progressive interpretation of a child's right to
family life, the court found expulsion of one or both parents for
immigration violations per se unreasonable where a child is a national or a
permanent resident of the country. Inasmuch as countries throughout
North and South America have adopted birthright nationality in their
national constitutions, this Inter-American Court rule creates a broad
limitation on States' authority to expel non-citizens in the Americas.
The standards described in the preceding paragraphs strongly suggest

325
326
327
328
329

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

275.
278.
279.
280.
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that the DNU violates the well-articulated protections of family life and
the best interests of the child under Inter-American and UN human rights
law. Most specifically, the provision of the DNU that makes people
inadmissible when they make a request for residency if they have
committed a crime punishable with jail, and only makes a waiver available
to immigrants who have been sentenced to less than three years, violates
this protection. Perhaps a dozen cases published by courts throughout
Argentina and discussed in the first section of this Article concern the
cases of irregular migrants who have lived many years in Argentina,
established families, and raised Argentine children. All of those cases
would trigger the inadmissibility ground that the DNU incorporated into
article 29. Many of them would not be eligible for the family unity waiver
due to the fact that their sentences exceeded three years. If Argentina
applies the DNU to these cases, it will certainly violate its human rights
obligations under the American Convention as elaborated by the InterAmerican Court.
This same analysis applies in the cases of cancelation of residency, but
the likely outcome in those cases under the DNU is even more troubling.
That is because cancelation of residency proceedings could be initiated
under the DNU against all of the respondents from the cases referenced in
the previous paragraph. As a matter of law under the DNU, certain people
who were granted a waiver to protect their right to family unity five or ten
years ago would be ineligible for such a waiver now, and their expulsion
would be mandatory. Notably, the decisions of many of those courts were
firmly rooted in human rights protections as incorporated into Argentine
law. Therefore, the President was certainly on notice that he was issuing
an edict that brought Argentina directly into conflict with its international
treaty obligations.
The collective action challenging the DNU raised this problem. The
trial court believed that the right to family reunification would be more
appropriately addressed through individual cases, reasoning that it was an
individual right that requires an analysis of the individual circumstances of
each case. 33 0 This failed to appreciate the rules of law established by the
Inter-American Commission and Court, which have found that simply
receiving a three-year sentence could never be grievous enough to justify
the incursion into the right of an Argentine child to be unified with her
parents. 331 The minority opinion of the appeals court Judge Alemany more

330 See Collective Action, supra note 233, at

§ XI.

331 See Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 323, T 280.
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faithfully incorporated international human rights law on this point, 332 but
this is still very much an open question in the DNU litigation.
If the Supreme Court does not resolve this systematic violation of noncitizens' right to family life and special protections for children, then the
individual litigation suggested by the trial court will be the only remaining
avenue. In order to effectively pursue this avenue, it will be necessary to
also challenge the restrictions on judicial protection implemented by the
DNU, which remain in place during the pendency of the appeal.
B.

Restoring due process andjudicialprotection

International human rights law also articulates important protections in
terms of due process and judicial protection. International human rights
bodies have often developed these norms in conjunction with substantive
human rights protections including, for example, the right to family life.
Indeed, respect for family life in the immigration context requires
procedures for balancing the equities of a non-citizen's life against the
authority of the State to expel her or him. 333 Additional procedural
protections include guarantees of individualized consideration of a
migrant's case, an opportunity to contest the reasons for expulsion, and the
ability to seek review of any decision to expel.
UN human rights treaty law provides specific due process guarantees
that apply to expulsion procedures. For example, the ICCPR provides that
non-citizens "lawfully in the territory of a State Party" may only be
expelled for reasons established in the law, and that they must be
permitted to present arguments against their expulsion before a competent
authority.3 34 These procedural protections have arguably become part of
general international law, 335 but they do not extend to irregular migrants.
For irregular migrants, the clearest protection appears to be the
absolute prohibition on collective expulsions.336 While the ICCPR does
not explicitly incorporate this protection, the HRC understands this

332 Camara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c.

EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, sec. XII,
https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/201 8/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf.
333 See Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶¶ 61-65 (2010), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/merits.asp
(finding independent violations of American Declaration Articles XVIII and XXVI, which include due
process and fair trial guarantees).

334 ICCPR, supra note 305, art. 13.
335 Chetail, supra note 304, at 54.

336 Id. at 55.
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protection to be implicit. 337 Moreover, this prohibition is explicit in the

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families ("ICRMW"), which requires
individualized consideration of all expulsions. 33 8 Moreover, the ICRMW
requires that expulsions only take place in pursuance of a decision by a
competent authority in accordance with the law, 33 9 that the decision is
communicated in a language the non-citizen can understand and in writing
if so requested, 3 4 and that the non-citizen has the opportunity to submit
the reasons he should not be expelled, and to seek a stay of expulsion,
unless the decision is made by a judicial authority. 34 1
There are divergent opinions about the right to judicial review of an
expulsion order under general international law. Prominent experts in
migrant rights argue alternatively that all non-citizens have a right to
judicial review, that only those who are lawfully present have such a right,
342
or that none, lawfully present or otherwise, hold such a right. Of course,
treaty law clarifies which of these positions prevails in certain contexts. In
particular, the American Convention protects due process and judicial
protection in its articles 8 and 25 respectively, 343 and the Inter-American
Court's jurisprudence in this area suggests that the summary expulsion
procedure under the DNJ is deficient.
The Inter-American Court, for example, has interpreted the right to a
fair trial enshrined in the American Convention to guarantee the right to
challenge an expulsion order before a court, as well as the right to a public
hearing and to present a complete defense. 3 The need for the full
application of this right in the Argentine context in order to ensure respect
for human rights is evident, particularly in light of the previous discussion
on the rights to family unity and special protections for children. Indeed,
the DNIU has established that the DNM has exclusive authority to grant
waivers of grounds of crime related inadmissibility and cancelation of

337 General Comment No. 15, supra note 307,

338
339
340
341
342

1

10.

G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 22(1) (Dec. 18, 1990).
Id. art. 22(2).
Id. art. 22(3).
Id. art. 22(4).
Chetail, supra note 304, at 56 (summarizing the positions of Guy Goodwin Gill, Maurice

Kamto, and Richaerd Plender, respectively).
343 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,

O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, arts. 8, 25.
344 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC- 18/03,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶¶ 124-27 (Sept. 17, 2003); see also Velez Loor v. Panama, infra
note 351,

1

146; but cf 90th UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, art. 14,

U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007).

¶

17,
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residency. 34 5 The practical result of this is that the violations of the right to
family life and special protection for children that will systematically
occur with the unavailability of a humanitarian waiver for persons with
sentences that exceed three years will not be reviewed by courts. This was
precisely the problem that the Inter-American Commission detected in
Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et. al, when it found that the United
States had not only violated the substantive rights of the petitioners, but
had also violated their procedural rights by prohibiting U.S. courts from
346
balancing the equities in the cases.
This problem was not specifically addressed in the decision of the trial
court in the collective action litigation, 347 but was denounced in the
minority opinion of the appeals court Judge Alemany. 348 This is another
question that may be resolved by the Supreme Court, but must be
challenged by individual non-citizens in expulsion proceedings while they
await that opinion.
In a broader sense, beyond this subject-matter limitation on the review
of federal courts embedded in the law by the DNU, there is the question of
whether the successive three-day deadlines violate due process protections
under human rights law. The trial court determined that this issue was
reviewable, and while the court upheld the summary expulsion procedure
in that case, 349 Judge Alemany of the appeals court found the three-day
deadlines violated due process principles. 3 50
Due process standards under the American Convention support Judge
Alemany's conclusion. First, the right to due process has been extended to
the administrative context, and to expulsion proceedings in particular.'

345 See DNU, supra note 1, art. 7.
346 See Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ff 61-65 (2010), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/merits.asp.
347 See generally Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 1 [la Inst.] [Federal
Administrative Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-

Ley
/
Amparo
DNM
https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf

16.986,"

348 Camara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c.

EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, see. XII,
https://vww.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf.
349 Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. I []a Inst.] [Federal Administrative
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo

Ley 16.986," 12, https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf.
350 Cimara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c.

EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, sec. XII,
https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf.
351 V61ez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
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Moreover, the Inter-American Commission has indicated that where
fundamental rights are at stake in expulsion proceedings, the most
expansive reading of due process rights is appropriate.352
The Inter-American Commission requires that migrants have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, and present their defense when they
face expulsion. 353 This includes having adequate time to collect
evidence,354 and the Commission has gone as far as to require that the
State provide the opportunity for migrants to examine witness and present
expert testimony to shed light on the circumstances relevant to their
expulsion. 35 Thus, the Commission has found that a State violates these
obligations when it conducts expulsion proceedings in an unreasonably
short period of time.356
In the decision of the trial court upholding the three-day timeframes for
the summary expulsion procedure established under the DNU, the court
indicated that comparable procedures under Argentine law had similarly
short timeframes. Without disputing this, the complexity of expulsion
proceedings, that include reconstructing immigration histories, as well as
the circumstances of underlying criminal convictions, and any mitigating
factors, would certainly seem to require more than three days.
The trial court did recognize a migrant's right to counsel in finding that
the government must notify the migrant of her right to an attorney at the
expense of the State if she cannot afford one. 357 Even if the three-day
timeframe does not begin to run until the attorney enters an appearance,
the notion that an attorney could adequately prepare a defense in the time
provided defies all logic. The attorney would need to meet with the client
to understand all the relevant details of the case, collect evidence,

H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, "f 141-42 (Nov. 23, 2010).
352 Loren Laroye Riebe Star, Jorge Bar6n Guttlein and Rodolfo Izal Elorz v. Mexico, Case

11.610,

Inter-Am.

Comm'n

H.R.,

Report

No.

¶

49/99

70

(1999),

http://cidh.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Mexico%20116 1.htm.
353 INTER-AM. COMM'N H.R., SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEURSHIP ON
MIGRANT
WORKERS
AND
THEIR
FAMILIES
IN
THE
HEMISPHERE,
http://www.iachr.org/annualrep/2000eng/chap.6a.htm.
354 Loren Laroye Riebe Star, Jorge Bar6n Guttlein and Rodolfo Izal Elorz v. Mexico, Case

11.610,

Inter-Am.

Comm'n

H.R.,

Report

No.

49/99

,

¶

55

(1999),

http://cidh.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Mexico%2011610.htm.
355 Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Human Rights ofMigrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons, Victims of
Human Trafficking and Internally Displaced Persons: Norms and Standards of the Inter-American

Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 46/15, ¶ 311 (Dec. 31, 2015).
356 Id. T 60.
357 Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. I [la Inst.] [Federal Administrative
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo

Ley 16.986," 16-18, https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf.
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including the testimony of any witnesses or experts, and present a wellreasoned defense. Even if this was the only thing that an attorney did for
three days, it would pose an insurmountable challenge. Moreover,
expecting that an attorney would only work on that one case simply does
not account for the realities of law practice, and cannot be sustained under
the American Convention standards elaborated above.
Judge Alemany from the appeals court expressed a particular concern
with the three-day timeframe for administrative and judicial appeals,
identifying jurisprudence from the Argentine Supreme Court that
supported this conclusion.358 Moreover, individual challenges that
highlight the inability of lawyers to adequately prepare a defense may
succeed in raising the human rights problem represented by the three-day
timeframes. Indeed, the jurisprudence presented in the first section of this
Article suggests that untimely filings by counsel, 359 as well an inability to
contact the migrant, are bases to find a violation of the migrant's right to
counsel.360 As attorneys document their inability to adequately defend
their clients through a procedure that is an ineffective means of vindicating
migrants' rights, courts should find that human rights require extensions of
the timeframes provided by the summary expulsion procedure.
Finally, the prohibition against arbitrary detention is a well-established
principle of general international law codified in a broad range of treaties,
and it has been applied fairly consistently to the context of immigration
detention. 36 1 For example, the ICCPR protects against arbitrary
362
and the HRC has interpreted that right as specifically
detention,
extending to immigration detention.363 That said, detaining immigrants for
purposes of immigration regulation and enforcement of immigration laws

358 C~mara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, "Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c.

EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, sec. XII,
https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf.
359 See Camara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal

Court of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2016, "Diop Matar, Elhadji c. EN-M
Interior
DNM
/
Recurso
Directo
DNM,"
3-4,
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/DM,%20E.pdf.
360 Camara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court

of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala 1, 13/9/2016, "Chein Alvarado, Errol James c. EN-M
directo
/
recurso
Interior-DNM
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CA,%20EJ.pdf.

DNM,"

4,

361 Chetail, supra note 304, at 50.
362 CCPR, supra note 305, art. 9.1.
363 16th UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 8: art. 9 (Right to Liberty
and Security of Persons), lI(June 30, 1982).
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has not been found to be arbitrary per se.364 Indeed, the HRC recognized in
an individual communication against Australia that there was no basis
under international law to conclude that the detention of an entering
asylum seeker was necessarily arbitrary. 365 Three specific limitations do
inform an inquiry into whether the detention of migrants is arbitrary: (1)
whether it is authorized by the law; (2) whether the deprivation of liberty
is reasonable, necessary and proportionate; and (3) whether there is a right
to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in court.366 The InterAmerican Court for its part has required that a detained migrant be
informed of the reasons for his detention and the nature of the proceedings
* 367
being conducted against him.
In the early cases on the right to migrate, Argentine courts found that
the detention of Chinese migrants prevented the State from meeting its
obligations to facilitate the regularization of migrants and guarantee their
access to counsel to formulate a defense. 368 This early association between
the freedom from detention and the ability to access a lawyer and build a
defense has important human rights dimensions. Indeed, migrants continue
to have a right to counsel and a right to regularize their status, which
factors in to the determination whether detention would be "reasonable,
necessary, and proportionate." Indeed, while the above cited international
human rights standards appear to permit the detention of irregular
migrants in Australia, the same body of law likely mandates a different
outcome in Argentina, where migrants continue to have a right to counsel
and an opportunity to regularize their status.
Human rights law provides a complete response to the DNU's
degradation of the right to family reunification, summary expulsion
procedure, and increased reliance on detention. Argentina's human rights
obligations require robust timeframes for expulsion proceedings to protect
the right to counsel, and the right to mount a defense. Moreover, the
expulsion procedure must permit full consideration of requests to reside in
Argentina to permit family reunification, which is guaranteed by both the
immigrant bill of rights and human rights law. The DNU has certainly
degraded the right to migrate in Argentina, but human rights law provides
a means to defend its essence.

364 Chetail, supra note 304, at 50.
365 UN Human Rights Committee, A. v. Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997).
366 Chetail, supra note 304, at 51-52.
367 See Velez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am.

Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218,¶ 109 (Nov. 23, 2010).
368 See, e.g., Cdmara Federal de Apelaciones de ParanA [CFed.], 11/6/2011, "HC deducido por
Dai Jianqing, Lin Xuehui, Xie Chenguang y Zhuang Bisheng," Causa No. 5-17.559-20.768/2011.
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V. CONCLUSION

The timing of President Macri's restrictionist DNU, just days after
President Trump issued his 2017 executive orders on immigration,
suggests some relationship between national trends of criminalization of
migrants and securitization of borders in the region. However, there are
some key differences between the Argentine legal system and the U.S.
legal system that will likely prevent Argentina from backsliding into the
same troubling patters of U.S. immigration enforcement that have been the
subject of rebuke for decades. Most notably, Macri's DNU did not touch
the immigrant bill of rights promulgated as part of the 2004 Law. This
means that a right to migrate persists under Argentine law, and
international human rights law continues to be directly embedded in that
concept through the 2004 Law and the Argentine Constitution.
The right to migrate represented a paradigm shift in how Argentina
managed migrant flows, ensuring that all irregular migrants got the
opportunity to regularize their status, free from detention, and with the
assistance of counsel provided by the State. Macri's DNU would have
Argentina shift back to a system that relies on the broad discretion of
immigration officials, makes expulsion the default for irregular migrants
and those who have committed crimes, and increases the likelihood of
detention. These steps strike at the heart of what the right to migrate has
come to signify, but the persistence of that right in the body of the law
should be understood as a counter measure to defend the core content of
that right. In this regard, international human rights law could provide the
framework to resist this incursion into the right to migrate.
The right to family reunification is central to the 2004 Law, and human
rights law helps to define the content of that right in a way that is
meaningful in Argentina. The right to family life of persons in Argentina
means that they should be able to reunite with family members living
abroad and stay with their family members in Argentina, even when they
have violated criminal laws. Immigration procedures and recourse to
judicial protection should assist Argentines and immigrants alike in
vindicating this and other important substantive rights, and to the extent
that they do not, human rights law requires their amendment. If Argentina
restores procedural fairness and provides immigrants with sufficient time
to secure counsel and articulate a defense, including the right to family
reunification, it will have retained the spirit of the right to migrate.
There is much work to do in Argentina to address the harm wrought by
President Macri's campaign to disparage immigrants, who have been
unfairly cast as criminals who threaten national security. Important aspects
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of the process of societal healing is the defense of the fundamental rights
of those immigrants whose place in Argentina society has been drawn into
question and the reassertion of the right to migrate.

